



Western Michigan University
ScholarWorks at WMU

Master's Theses

Graduate College

8-1981

The Nixon Doctrine: Its Application in the Arabian Gulf

Abdulwahed Al-Mawlawi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses



Part of the American Politics Commons

Recommended Citation

Al-Mawlawi, Abdulwahed, "The Nixon Doctrine: Its Application in the Arabian Gulf" (1981). *Master's Theses*. 3845.

https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3845

This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.



THE NIXON DOCTRINE:
ITS APPLICATION IN THE ARABIAN GULF

by

Abdulwahed Al-Mawlawi

A Thesis

Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 1981

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A special debt of gratitude is owed to my thesis advisor, Dr. Lawrence Ziring, Chairman of the Institute of Government and Politics at Western Michigan University, for his contributions of time, thought and guidance.

I also wish to express my sincere appreciation to Pamela Hutchinson for linguistic polishing and for the arduous task of typing the manuscript.

Abdulwahed Al-Mawlawi

No arm of the sea has been, or is of greater interest, alike to the geologist and archaeologist, the historian and geographer, the merchant, the statesman, and the student of strategy, than the inland water known as the Persian Gulf.

Sir Arnold Wilson, 1928

More than ever, the question of who controls what in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East is the key to who controls what in the world.

Richard M. Nixon, 1980

THE NIXON DOCTRINE:
ITS APPLICATION IN THE ARABIAN GULF

Abdulwahed Al-Mawlawi

Western Michigan University, 1981

Western Europe and Japan have been heavily dependent on Arabian Gulf oil; the United States' dependency is growing. Hence, the "security" of this region and consequently the securing of the oil flow has become a major strategic issue to the Western and particularly the U.S. policy makers. To the U.S., the British "withdrawal" from the Gulf in 1971 created a strategic "vacuum". Aggressive arms sales to the region and the "policeman" role of the Shah of Iran in the Gulf served as the main U.S. instruments of filling this vacuum. This was a direct application of the "Nixon Doctrine". This Doctrine came as a direct result of the U.S. failure in Vietnam and of the new international power realignment. According to the Doctrine, the U.S. sought to supply arms and assistance to its "threatened" allies and friends, provided that they assumed the primary responsibility for providing the necessary manpower. The Doctrine's main test and success in the Gulf occurred when thousands of Iranian troops helped Oman crush the Dhufari Rebellion in 1975. The triumph of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought the end of this Doctrine in the Gulf. This was due mainly to the U.S. failure to foresee the collapse of the Shah, and the failure to grasp the complexities of Arab and Iranian politics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

LIST OF TABLES AND MAPS vi

INTRODUCTION 1

DOCTRINES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 4

 What is a "Doctrine"? 5

 How Do Doctrines Shape Policy? 5

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE 7

THE GULF: AN OVERVIEW 14

 Beginnings 14

 Importance of the Gulf 23

 Threats to the Status-Quo 29

THE SOVIET INTRUSION 36

 Geopolitical Interests 36

 Difficulties 37

 Presence in the Indian Ocean 39

 Aims 41

THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN THE GULF 44

 Interests 44

 An Instrument of Control 46

 Policies 49

 The Arms Sales 56

THE SHAH'S ROLE	63
Father and Son	63
A Dual-Objective	67
Arms, Money, Influence	70
Different Fronts	73
Roots of Deterioration	78
OMAN: THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN ACTION	84
A History	84
P.F.L.O	87
The Shah's Intervention	90
The U.S. Role	91
CONCLUSION	96
APPENDICES	103
BIBLIOGRAPHY	118

LIST OF TABLES AND MAPS

TABLES

1. Foreign Military Sales Deliveries (Percentage of Worldwide Total)	59
2. Arms Deliveries to the Gulf Countries, 1970-75	59
3. U.S. Foreign Military Sales and Orders to the Persian [Arabian] Gulf Countries, 1950-75	60

MAPS

The Middle East	15
The Persian [Arabian] Gulf Area	24
Sultanate of Oman	85

INTRODUCTION

An accident of geology and an appetite for energy have made the Arabian (Persian) Gulf region (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran) a focus of worldwide interest. Conservative figures show that by 1970, the eight Gulf oil-producers exported about 80 percent of the Japanese oil needs, 70 percent of Western Europe's needs, and 5 percent of United States oil needs. Thus, the Gulf's oil has become the blood stream of Western Europe and Japan's industries. This has put the Gulf at the top of the list for the Western and, accordingly, United States policy makers. Hence, "stability" of the region to secure the oil flow has been a very major concern for Western Europe, Japan, and mainly the United States.

Great Britain has a long history of hegemony in the Gulf through her commercial interests. This hegemony lasted for 150 years and ended in 1971 when a 1968 Labor Government decision was implemented to "phase-out" the British presence "East of Suez." The United States Government "feared" that the British withdrawal created a "vacuum" that could invite a Soviet presence or a radical political subversion.

The unsuccessful experience in Vietnam, coupled with domestic pressures against U.S. direct participation in Vietnam-type wars prevented the U.S. from filling this vacuum directly. However, in the spirit of the "Nixon Doctrine," Iran, and to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia, were chosen to play the major roles in "maintaining stability" in the Gulf.

The Doctrine, in the words of Richard Nixon (1980):

provided that the United States would supply arms and assistance to nations threatened by aggression, if they were willing to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower necessary for their defense. (p. 197)

Agressive arms sales in the Gulf and the "policeman" role of the Shah in the region served as the two main instruments for the implementation of the Doctrine in the Gulf. The Doctrine was first tested, through the Shah, in Oman. The aim was to protect Sultan Qabus bin Said from the "scientific-socialist" Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), which in 1965 led a rebellion in the province of Dhufar.

The Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf, however, lasted only until 1979, when its main instrument, the Shah was deposed by the Iranian revolution.

It will be the purpose of this thesis to study the application of the Nixon Doctrine in a vital area of the world, namely the Arabian Gulf.

In carrying out this task, the thesis will address itself to a number of questions:

1. What roles do doctrines play in the United States foreign policy?
2. How did the Nixon Doctrine develop?
3. How did the U.S. perceive its interests in the Gulf? and the threats to them?
4. What were the main principles of the U.S. policy in the Gulf?
5. What means and tools did the U.S. use in its implementation of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf?

6. How was the Doctrine put to the test in Oman?

7. Why did the Doctrine fail in the Gulf?

In addressing these questions, several historical backgrounds will be presented to illuminate the context.

It became evident to this researcher that the usable sources for this study are very limited due to two factors. First, the subject is a relatively current one. Second, due to the sensitive nature of this subject to the U.S. and to the states of the Gulf, there is a paucity of valuable research material, such as primary sources. This has led to the use of more secondary sources than desired.

The primary sources are derived mainly from: the works of the main actors of the Doctrine, namely Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran; Congressional hearings; articles written by some former "on-the-scene" actors of the Nixon Doctrine.

DOCTRINES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The idea of an explicit foreign policy "doctrine" grew slowly in American history. The term derives from the so-called "Monroe Doctrine" of 1823. But there is little reason to believe that President James Monroe consciously intended a permanent policy statement when he announced to the Congress that the U.S. would not accept extra-American intervention in the Eastern Hemisphere. Dexter Perkins (1955), however, made a convincing case in his book, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1926, that the dangers envisioned had been unreal. Monroe's declaration attained doctrine stature in 1845 when President James Polk inaugurated the precedent of citing it in diplomatic controversy to give his position an aura of venerability. Nevertheless, Monroe (and Polk) set what has become the basic method of establishing a foreign policy position which has been adhered to since.

During the century after Polk, fundamental foreign policy positions were usually named "policies" -- the Open Door Policy, the Good Neighbor Policy -- but the difference is only in the word. Following World War II, the fashion began of identifying foreign policy "doctrines" by Presidents' names: the "Truman Doctrine," the "Eisenhower Doctrine," the "Kennedy Doctrine." But this labeling was done by commentators and journalists, not explicitly by the President in question. President Nixon (1971), however, broke new ground. For the first time a President explicitly stated and labeled a "doctrine" from the beginning and, moreover, demanded a policy embodying "a coherent

vision of the world and a rational conception of America's interests" (p. 5).

What is a "Doctrine"?

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a doctrine is a statement of "principle of policy," that is, something larger and broader than "mere" policy.

A doctrine is a flexible context within which specific policies are developed. The evolution of the Monroe Doctrine is the best example of how a doctrine can be modified and reinterpreted. The Monroe Doctrine had originally been aimed to prevent the intervention of European powers in the New World, but was interpreted by Theodore Roosevelt as a justification for the intervention of the U.S. to prevent conditions which might tend to invite extra-American intervention. The Roosevelt Corollary led to the coercion of the very states it intended to protect, and was thus used to justify establishment and maintenance of control by the U.S. over governments of Latin America.

As President Nixon (1971, p. 5) has noted, the "Nixon Doctrine" is a modification of the "Truman Doctrine" of containment of communism through means that could include U.S. military action, if necessary. The Eisenhower Doctrine was an earlier modification.

How Do Doctrines Shape Policy?

All U.S. Doctrines have been unilateral statements of purpose by U.S. Presidents based upon the generally recognized Presidential prerogative to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States. They

have, of course, no validity in law and are not legally binding on any American. But, because they are published abroad and will be accepted and acted upon by foreign powers as definite statements of American purpose, the U.S. loses credibility if it fails to adhere to its stated doctrines or violates them without notice. Since the establishment of a doctrine is an American action, the U.S. has the right to interpret its own intent. Needless to say, the interest of the U.S. in harmony and stability requires that its principles of policy be clearly understood abroad.

Doctrines are important as statements of intention directed to foreign countries, but usually the internal purposes of doctrines are far more important. Sociologists and politicians have long understood that leading large numbers of people in a common direction requires clear, simple, salient statements of purpose. Such statements, or slogans, are prerequisite to coherence and continuity in public support for, or assent to, foreign policy -- particularly in a democracy. Likewise, such statements are crucial as axioms which make governmental actions coherent and reasonably continuous by guiding lower level policy decisions. Modern governments are huge bureaucracies facing decisions that involve thousands of disparate specialties; their decisions can be made relatively coherent only by being based on clear, simple, concise statements of the government's axiomatic policy assumptions.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE

As the result of its unsuccessful experience in Vietnam, the U.S. was awakened to discover that other nations within the capitalist and communist spheres had expanded their economies at record rates while acquiring the latest military hardware. Only now can we begin to appreciate the magnitude of power realignments that have taken place over the past fifteen years. Whereas once it was common to define all international crises in terms of the great-power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, today most analysts agree that this bipolar balance has given way to a multipower world in which five "key world power centers" -- China, Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States -- figure in the global power equation.

The new world balance of power was further complicated by the presence of crucial new parameters: the international currency crisis; trade rivalries within the Western-Industrial camp; the Sino-Soviet dispute; competition for energy supplies; etc. Furthermore, the growth of new sub-regional powers (many of them armed with the latest European or American armaments) like Iran, Israel, India, and Brazil, further complicates the situation.

President Nixon (1971) painted the landscape of international relations in his report to Congress:

The postwar order of international relations -- the configuration of power that emerged from the Second World War -- is gone. With it are gone the conditions which have determined the assumptions and practice of United States foreign policy since 1945.

No single sudden upheaval marked the end of the post-war era in the way that the World Wars of this century shattered

the prewar orders of international relations. But the cumulative change since 1945 is profound nonetheless:

- Western Europe and Japan, nations physically or psychologically debilitated by the war, have regained their economic vitality, social cohesion, and political self-assurance. Their new vigor transforms our relationship into a more balanced and dynamic coalition of independent states.
- New nations have found identity and self-confidence and are acting autonomously on the world stage. They are able to shoulder more responsibility for their own security and well-being.
- In the last 20 years, the nature of the Communist challenge has been transformed. The Stalinist bloc has fragmented into competing centers of doctrine and power. One of the deepest conflicts in the world today is between Communist China and the Soviet Union. The most prevalent Communist threats now are not massive military invasions, but a more subtle mix of military, psychological, and political pressures. These developments complicate the patterns of diplomacy, presenting both new problems and new prospects.
- At the same time, the Soviet Union has expanded its military power on a global scale and has moved from an inferior status in strategic weapons to one comparable to the United States. This shift in the military equation has changed both defense doctrines and the context of diplomacy.
- Around the globe, East and West, the rigid bipolar world of the 1940's and 1950's has given way to the fluidity of a new era of multilateral diplomacy. Fifty-one nations joined the United Nations at its founding in 1945; today 127 are members. It is an increasingly heterogeneous and complex world, and the dangers of local conflict are magnified. But so, too, are the opportunities for creative diplomacy.
- Increasingly we see new issues that transcend geographic and ideological borders and confront the world community of nations. Many flow from the nature of modern technology. They reflect a shrinking globe and expanding interdependence. They include the challenges of exploring new frontiers of space and sea and the dangers of polluting the planet. These global issues call for a new dimension of international cooperation. (pp. 3-5)

Despite these changes and uncertainties, U.S. foreign policy objectives remained essentially unchanged over the past three decades.

The principal objectives have been, and will continue to be, the maintenance of the U.S. position as the world's paramount military and economic power, and the intensification of U.S. control over foreign markets and sources of raw materials (particularly energy sources). This U.S. predominance was evident in Nixon's (1971) assertion: "Thus, while lowering our overseas presence and direct military involvement, our new policy calls for a new form of leadership, not abdication of leadership" (p. 17).

These objectives require, in turn, the containment of Soviet power and influence (the U.S.S.R. being considered the most potent threat to U.S. world supremacy), the continued leadership of its allies (particularly West Europe and Japan), and the prevention or defeat of national upheavals in the Third World countries. While U.S. objectives remain dynamically constant, however, the means available to attain them are continually diminishing. Economically the U.S. exports have long ceased to dominate world trade. In the military arena, the erosion of U.S. leverage was even more pronounced: although the United States was still stronger militarily than any other single power (or than most combinations of two or three powers), it had to be prepared to face a situation in which it could wind up on the weaker side of a world power realignment. Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer noted:

Our relative military power throughout the world has peaked and is declining. We no longer possess that substantial military superiority which in the past provided us with such a significant margin of overall military power that we could, with confidence, protect our interests worldwide. Henceforth, we will have to chart out our course with much

greater precision and calculate our risks much more cautiously. (Foreign Assistance, 1972, pp. 881-881)

In response to the changing domestic and international environment, American policy-makers sought new instruments of influence and power in order to prevent further reductions in U.S. leverage. By negotiating a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT) with the U.S.S.R., the Nixon Administration helped to slow down the strategic arms race while preserving America's lead in strategic weaponry. Creation of an all-volunteer army and reductions in overseas U.S. troop deployments neutralized much anti-military sentiment at home, while acquisition of new jumbo transport jets and added naval attack forces assured a continued U.S. capability to intervene abroad. Military assistance and arms sales rose spectacularly to insure that client regimes would retain sufficient muscle to stay in power even after the withdrawal of U.S. expeditionary forces. Such military programs were complemented by various economic, political, and diplomatic measures designed to provide U.S. policy-makers with a wider spectrum of options with which to pursue U.S. objectives. In Chile, for instance, the Nixon Administration employed a subtle combination of economic warfare (aid cut-offs, a credit blockade, freezes on deliveries of key machine parts, etc.) and political intrigue to paralyze the Allende government while encouraging its opponents (especially those in the armed forces). A similar "mix" of tactics was employed during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 to preserve the U.S. alliance with Pakistan while at the same time avoiding an irreconcilable breach with India. On a larger scale, the approach was

most evident in the diplomacy of detente: by reopening ties with the People's Republic of China, and collaborating with the Soviet Union in the containment of local disputes, the Nixon Administration succeeded in bringing U.S. foreign policy into a better alignment with the actual balance of world power, permitting a more pragmatic and economical expenditure of foreign policy resources. At the same time, of course, the Washington was pursuing various diplomatic and political maneuvers designed to use the Sino-Soviet split in compelling these two countries to dissipate their own military resources and thus to reduce their capacity to offset U.S. involvements elsewhere. (See Barnett, 1972, pp. 14-18; Kolko, 1973, pp. 8-17 for discussion.)

Nixon's new tactical initiatives were formally summarized in what has come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. When first promulgated in July 1969, the Nixon Doctrine called for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Asia and the assumption of a "forward defense" role by the ground forces of U.S. clients, liberally supported by U.S. air and naval forces (Brodine & Selden, 1972). Nixon explained this new theme in his address to the U.S. Congress in his 1970 "State of the World" address. As he explained in "New Strategy for Peace," Nixon (1970) asserted:

Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot and will not conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a difference and is considered in our interest. . .we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate, but we shall

look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. (pp. 55-56)

The three key elements of the Nixon Doctrine are:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. (Nixon, 1979, pp. 12-14)

The Nixon Doctrine therefore, shifted the U.S. role from fighting on behalf of an embattled regime, as in Vietnam, to providing massive military aid and training, to be supplemented, if necessary, by U.S. air and naval power. The image of future U.S. relations with Third World allies was embodied in the "Vietnamization" phase of U.S. involvement in Indo-China. In this context, Nixon and Kissinger sought "special relationships" with key governments in the Third World. The idea was to make these governments junior partners in the heavy work of imperial management. Thus the idea of "regional superpower" was born, and Iran, along with Brazil, Indonesia and Israel, became prime candidates.

By 1972 the Doctrine had been given a much wider interpretation: instead of applying it merely to Asia, it had been extended to the entire globe; and instead of referring exclusively to military resources and options, it encompassed the whole spectrum of foreign-policy operations. As Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird (1972), stated, "The Nixon Doctrine and its supporting strategy . . . provide

the United States with a strategy that encompasses our relationships with all nations" (p. 7). And also as stated by Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements, Jr. in a 1973 appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Nixon Doctrine incorporated three basic principles:

(1) partnership with friendly nations in which the obligations, as well as the benefits, of peace are equitably shared; (2) a sufficiency of overall military strength, both U.S. and allies, in relation to that of others; (3) a willingness, in company with our friends, to negotiate in order to seek solutions to the underlying causes that lead to conflict. (Mutual Development, 1973, p. 108)

Stated in more pragmatic terms, the revised Doctrine envisioned the United States at the center of a whole new galaxy of power relationships and alliances in which armed combat would be delegated, insofar as is possible, to the weaker and poorer nations while detente and collaboration would govern relations between the richer and stronger nations (including those in the Communist bloc).


THE GULF: AN OVERVIEW

Beginnings

The Arabian Gulf was of considerable importance to British mercantile interests. Although most of its activities were in the Indian subcontinent and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the British East India Company was interested in the Gulf as a communication route, as the major access location to Persian silk and other products, as a market for British manufacturers, and as an area which had to be controlled if the routes used by the ships of the Company and its clients were to be secure. Thus, from 1616 until 1858 the British East India Company established and maintained an increasing number of trading stations and ultimately a fleet of well-armed ships in the Gulf. The system of political tactics and relations developed by the British over the course of some three centuries was crowned by the "Special Treaty" system with each sheikh (Bahrain in 1880 and 1892, the Trucial tribalities in 1892, Kuwait in 1899 and Qatar in 1916) (Kelly, 1962; Busch, 1967). Under this system,

the ruler surrendered external sovereignty to the United Kingdom and accepted a non-alienation bond pledging not to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of his land except to the British government. Between 1913 and 1922 the bonds were reinforced by explicit undertakings not to issue oil concessions without prior British endorsement. (Hurewitz, 1974, p. 19)

These means of control gave the British Empire exclusive powers in the Gulf in the key early decades of oil exploration and development in this century.



Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 344.

The British East India Company's founding Charter of 1600 granted it "many exclusive privileges," primarily the monopoly of Indian trade, with the power to prohibit "others of the community" from operating within its area except when licensed to do so by the Company. The Charter was periodically renewed and in 1661, the Company was granted the power to make peace or war with any ruler who was not a Christian.

The events of the Seven Years' War [1756-1763] transformed the East India Company from a commercial into a military and territorial power. It was then that the foundation was laid of the present British Empire in the East. (Marx & Engels, 1972, p. 46)

This clause was revoked after the Company had fulfilled its mercenary function -- the 1793 Charter reserved to the Crown the power to declare war or to enter into treaties.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the East India Company had consolidated its monopoly of East India trade and was the largest and most powerful of all the English trading organizations. The Directorate, located in London, was a "closed oligarchy dominated by a small group whose ranks were seldom broken save by death" (Furber, 1948, pp. 11-12).

British presence in the Gulf dates from early in the seventeenth century when it helped eliminate Portuguese domination of the area. Early in the sixteenth century the Portuguese fleet sailed into the Gulf and captured the Island of Hormuz from which they commanded the whole of the Gulf. Portuguese sovereignty entailed outright conquest, exaction of tribute and control of customs. Forts were built and

garrisons established at strategic points in the Gulf. Repeated revolts of the local peoples against Portuguese rule during the sixteenth century were unsuccessful; even the powerful Ottoman Empire could not dislodge them. Toward the end of the century, however, the Dutch and British appeared, negotiating for commercial trading privileges. Unlike the Portuguese whose undisguised intent was to establish an empire, these Europeans presented themselves as "peaceful traders" seeking no more than commercial trading privileges from the indigenous rulers.

In 1619, the British East India Company had established a warehouse on the Persian coast near Hormuz, but the Portuguese presence prevented further expansion in the Gulf. Meanwhile, Shah Abbas of Persia had been moving steadily to prevent Portuguese domination of Persia's Gulf coast. The Shah obtained armed ships from the East India Company with which he attacked and finally drove the Portuguese from their stronghold on Hormuz in 1622. From that time, Portuguese power in the area declined rapidly. In turn for their aid, the East India Company secured exceptional trading privileges, including a monopoly of Persian silk and a share in the custom duties of the port. In the Gulf, the Company had to deal with not only the Persian Shah, but also the Ottoman Empire via its governor at Basra, and the various local tribes on the Arab coast.

By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the tribal groups, which at present form ruling families, had established control over certain regions of the Gulf and had begun to compete with each other

for control of the pearl fishery and trade of the Gulf. Ships were the essential strategic resource for maintaining control of the Gulf and they were attacked and captured when possible. Although the Arabs usually avoided the well-armed, long-distance vessels of the East India Company which sailed between the East and London, the "country traders" sailing between Indian ports and the Gulf and often owned by English merchants under license of the Company were vulnerable to attack as competitors. Thus, relations between British and Arab interests became increasingly hostile.

Political instability of the area prevailed in spite of the presence of the East India Company and the diffusion of political authority among a number of sheikhs. Each sheikh exercised power over a relatively small geographic area. The result was a power vacuum and in the eighteenth century piracy began to flourish with greater than usual vigor. Thus, the major issue during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was "piracy" against British ships by various Arab sheikhs. Dominant among the "pirates" was the Qawasim tribal federation, located on both sides of the Gulf but whose major port was Ras al-Khaima. After several attempts, the British finally defeated the Qawasim, and concluded the Treaty of Peace in 1820. From then on, British ships and forces were stationed in the Gulf to "maintain order" and to protect British commerce. The treaty did not prohibit wars among the Arab tribes and economic activity continued to be disrupted by local tribes competing to expand their influence. Thus, in 1835 and again in 1853, a Maritime Truce was signed by the

British Government and local leaders of the Gulf Coast. This treaty of peace established a permanent truce at sea in the area, and the small city-states that were identified in the document became known as the Trucial States. This name continued in use until the formation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971. The UAE is comprised of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah.

This Pax Britannica had the effect of freezing the position as it then was and descendants of five Shaikhs who signed the Perpetual Maritime Truce [1853] are still independent Rulers of States, although two of them rule over little more than one village each. (Hay, 1959, p. 14)

As a result of the 1853 Truce and treaties signed with Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Trucial States in the late nineteenth century, and with Qatar in 1916, the British established exclusive control over the foreign affairs of these states, and London also enjoyed considerable influence over their domestic affairs. A British agent lived in every important port as advisor to the ruling Sheikh and he maintained a vigilant collection of information on all commercial and political activities. The duties of the British Political Resident of the Gulf and of the local Political Agents included offering "constant advise and encouragement" to local rulers, the administration of justice, safeguarding the interests of sterling and British trade, "encouraging the development of education on the right lives," and negotiations for new agreements or for changes in those existing "to make sure that nothing is denied which will seriously effect the position of the rulers or the British Government (Hay, 1959, pp. 19-24).

During the 1830s, the fear of a Russian approach to India first became manifest. The importance of the Gulf in relation to the Russian movement into Iraq or Iran was evident. Until the end of the Nineteenth Century, the British influence reached only as far as Bahrain. The Arabian mainland beyond Trucial Oman was outside the scope of British control. This was changed in 1899 by a non-alienation agreement with Kuwait which had the objective of preventing Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Germany, from gaining a position on the Gulf shore. This agreement did affect Ottoman suzerainty; Ottoman claims to the northwest coast of the Gulf were not contested. In 1913 however, the so-called Blue Line Agreement divided Ottoman and British spheres in Arabia at a point south of Ugair. At the insistence of the Indian Government, Qatar was placed for the first time under British control because an Ottoman garrison had been stationed in Doha after the expiration of an 1869 agreement allowing for Ottoman existence. In 1916, Qatar was brought under an agreement similar to those with the Trucial States and Bahrain.

The Indian Government had won the argument with London as to the policy to be pursued in Kuwait and Bahrain, but it lost a more significant contest in relation to the Persian coast. In his statement of May 5, 1903, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, had stated that Britain would view "the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified point in the Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests" (Busch, 1967, p. 186). Yet the Indian Government was overridden by the Colonial office when the Anglo-Russian agreement

of 1907 placed the whole of the Iranian shore of the Gulf, with the exception of Bandar Abbas, in the neutral not the British zone. There was no recognition of Britain's special position in the Gulf and it became clear that Britain would not oppose an ultimate Russian outlet in the Gulf.

The First World War brought important changes in the situation in the Gulf. The Ottoman power was finally removed from the area. Iraq passed under British control; Al Hasa had already fallen to the Wahhabi state in 1913. The dangers from Russia and Germany were, for a time, removed. Soviet hopes of revolution in Iran during the period immediately following the October Revolution were disappointed and the renewed Soviet interest and support for popular front movements during the mid-1920s also came to nothing. German interests were not a real factor in the immediate Gulf area in the late 1930s. The same could be said for the Italians whose ambitions were concentrated in the Red Sea area. Thus, Britain became supreme throughout the entire length of the Gulf.

British supremacy lasted until the end of World War II. After 1945 it declined rapidly in all the peripheral areas. First, and most importantly, the great pillar of the British position in the Gulf, India, achieved independence in 1947. Second, Britain could not afford the cost of maintaining supremacy in other parts of the Middle East. After World War II the British withdrew from Palestine and Egypt; they lost their influence in Jordan and Iraq. They no longer had the ability to defend Iran against the U.S.S.R. Finally, Great

Britain was forced to withdraw from Aden. In 1961, Britain dropped her claim to protect Kuwait and her subsequent action in sending troops to meet the threat from Iraq may have been the last assertion of British paramountcy in the Gulf.

This historical survey demonstrates that although Britain's influence in the Gulf dates from the early Seventeenth Century, her supremacy in the southern part dates only from the first half of the Nineteenth Century. Her domination over the whole area lasted only a short time -- from 1914 to the 1950s -- and relied more on the absence of rivals than on the ability or willingness of Britain to assert her power. There was no real base in the Gulf until the construction of naval facilities at Bahrain in 1935. Britain's influence was limited to securing navigation of the Gulf against immediate and prospective threats to her commercial lines. When oil in Iran and Iraq became a major interest, British supremacy in the Gulf was already virtually established. With the ending of the British Empire in India, oil became the major British interest in the Gulf. The significance of this change was not immediately apparent. Britain did not show much interest in developing sources of oil in areas immediately under her control. The Bahrain and Saudi fields were developed by U.S. interests while, as the events of 1951 in Iran showed, the British position in the Gulf was unable to assure control of her traditional Middle Eastern sources. But in the nine Gulf sheikhdoms and Oman, the British military and political presence was still considered a major "stabilizing" force. On January 16, 1968, British Prime Minister

Harold Wilson announced the final British withdrawal from the Gulf area by 1971.


After 150 years, the British were relinquishing their security role. With the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, Britain no longer needed forces in the Gulf to protect her imperial communications to the east. At the same time, a new imperative for Gulf security had arisen: oil. By 1968, the Labor Party, then in power, concluded that Britain's oil interests would not be seriously threatened by the British withdrawal. Recalling the difficulties surrounding the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967, the Labor Party concluded that it was better to leave before a radical nationalist movement forced them out.

Importance of the Gulf

Historically, the Arabian Gulf was important mainly as a part of the British lifeline to India. Since the discovery of oil in the 1930s, however, the Gulf has acquired a new significance.

Oil

Oil has been considered the most political of all commodities moving in international commerce. Recent experience in the Middle East and particularly since 1973 (Arab production cutbacks, price hikes, a five month oil embargo, ruptures in the Atlantic Alliance, a scramble for alternative energy supplies) more than justifies this view.



Source: Nakhleh, 1975a, p. 1.

The Gulf region has become significant to the world community, particularly the great powers, because of the vast petroleum resources discovered over the last forty years. Petroleum production of the littoral states has increased enormously, while the dependence of the industrialized world on Arabian Gulf oil has grown (see Appendices A and B).

The reasons for the especially rapid growth in the demand for oil are numerous, but one overwhelming fact dominated: the cost of producing oil was much lower than the cost of producing practically any other source of energy. When oil could be produced at ten or twenty cents a barrel, as it could in a large part of the Middle East, no other source of energy could compete. The selling price of the world's oil reflected much more than ten or twenty cents of production cost.

Oil is unique among the world's commodities. It is a resource which is plentiful and yet exhaustible. It is largely concentrated in the Middle East, not only an area of traditional strategic importance and great power rivalries, but also one which provides the locale for some of the most persistent international conflicts.

The Gulf area is considered to hold 50 percent of the world's oil "proven reserves" (ten times those of the U.S.). It also accounts for 60 percent of all oil moving into international trade (The Economic Intelligence, 1976, p. 1; also see Appendices C and D for data).

Figures for world dependence on the Gulf oil do differ a little, but in general they are very high (see Appendix E). Conservative

figures show that:

The three biggest oil consumers, the U.S., Western Europe and Japan, together accounted for 38 million barrels a day, about two-thirds of the world total. Proportionately, Japan's dependence was heaviest. Oil supplied 80 percent of all Japanese energy requirements; virtually 100 percent of this oil (5.4 million barrels a day) had to be imported; and 76 percent of the imports came from the Persian [Arabian] Gulf. Roughly 64 percent of Western Europe's energy needs were met by oil; nearly all of the 15.2 million barrels a day it burned were imported and 68 percent of the imports were of Persian Gulf origin. The U.S. was the biggest oil consumer, but the 16.8 million barrels a day we burned represented only 47 percent of our total energy consumption. We imported close to 37 percent of our oil in 1973, but the bulk came from Caribbean and Canadian sources. Only 13.5 percent of our imports -- 5 percent of all oil we burned -- came from the Persian Gulf. (Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 72)

Europe and Japan will continue to be heavily dependent upon Gulf oil. The U.S. is expected to be more dependent on Middle East oil, totaling approximately 25 percent of its oil imports. The Soviet Union's interest in the Gulf oil countries is also increasing. It is probable that with greatly increased industrial need, the communist bloc will become a net importer of oil from beyond communist Eurasia.

The control of oil prices passed from foreign concessionaires to indigenous national authorities in the oil-producing countries only after October 1973. Until then, the "big seven" oil companies (five American, one British and one Anglo-Dutch) dominated the industry by their ownership of most of the world's low-cost oil and by their vertical expansion into refining, transportation, and marketing.

Economic

By 1978, as the result of periodic raises in the price of oil --

especially since late 1973 -- by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Gulf states accumulated a revenue that amounted to over \$85 billion (see Appendices E, G and H). Revenues for 1981 are substantially higher. Saudi Arabia alone is expected to reach \$123.5 billion in oil revenues (Gupte, 1981, p. A1). This newly acquired wealth has placed the Gulf countries among the main actors of the international economic system.

Strategic

The strategic significance of the Arabian Gulf is two-fold: communications and oil. This significance as a highway and as a doorway has been apparent throughout history, but unmistakably so since the growth and flowering of Britain's eastern empire. Britain's ability to command the Gulf checked the Middle Eastern designs of Russia and Iran. Britain's power also contained Ottoman and Egyptian forces and kept at bay the European powers in their drives toward the east. All these checkmates were played on the Indian chessboard since Basra, Iraq, was in effect the backdoor to Bombay. A threat to India and Pakistan was also a threat to the Commonwealth.

Today the Gulf is one of the great channels for international air communication between Europe and South Asia, and between the Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean. Overflying rights are important to all using these routes. As a channel, the Gulf is vital for the export of oil and its narrow mouth, the Strait of Hormuz, is a choke-point for the external trade of all its inhabitants.

Strategically, the Gulf offers an avenue through which Soviet power, apart from its immediate significance in the Middle East, might hope to flank the African continent on the one hand and the Indian subcontinent on the other. The Kremlin would like to establish a permanent and effective naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Oil, of course, has great strategic implications of its own. At this point, it is sufficient to say that Middle East oil, proceeding mainly via the Gulf, is still, and long will be, the noncommunist world's main source of supply. Denial of this supply of oil in times of emergency or war would have profound consequences on world power balances. Oil is also the principal basis for commerce between Western Europe and the Gulf states. Thus the interruption of this activity would be harmful for the former and disastrous for the latter.

The waters of the Gulf have a fundamentally simple military and strategic aspect. Twenty-six miles of island-studded water separates Arabia from Iran at the Strait of Hormuz. To seal that entrance, or to deny the movement of shipping within, is relatively easy. The Gulf would thus be made into a lake with no communication to the outside world. In this sense, command of the Gulf waters implies command of the entire littoral. Thus the Gulf has become vital to world powers and particularly to the United States. The State Department stated that "in terms of the global U.S. strategic positions, we clearly have a strong interest in maintaining cooperative relations with the states of the Gulf" (U.S. Interests, 1972, p. 141).

Because the Persian Gulf is important, the argument has been propounded that it is, in effect, the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Western forces on the Gulf are as essential to Europe and the United States as they are on the Rhine.

Threats to the Status-Quo

The British Presence

Because the Gulf provided oil, the life-blood of Western industry, Britain did not follow its departure from the other Arab countries with that from the Gulf. This lingering British presence was in contrast to the decolonization process that was taking place in the whole of the Arab world during the 1950s. The revolution of 1952 in Egypt led by Gamal Abdul-Nasser, the Algerian revolt of 1954, and Iraq's revolution of 1958 are only a few examples of that process. This decolonization politicized and tended to radicalize the Arab world.

Britain, and later the U.S., continued to exploit Gulf oil by preventing it from falling into the hands of the national authorities. This was a cause for much of the unrest that followed. A few examples of that frustration were the unsuccessful revolts of Bahrain between 1954-1956, of Qatar in 1963, and of Kuwait in 1959. The struggle against the British presence was intensified in Aden in the early sixties. Aden gained independence in 1967. In Dhufar, a rebellion began in June 1965 and continued until 1975, when it was defeated militarily but not politically.

The end results of the British presence and policies in the Gulf have enhanced the Soviet Union's position. Resentment of the British colonial presence caused many, especially the educated elite, to turn to political extremism. To many, the alternative was radical ideologies. The leaders of the successful revolution of Aden are leftists, the projected ideological basis of the Dhufari Rebellion is Marxist-Leninist, and Iraq has grown closer to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has been very active in using these frustrations to serve its own interests. According to the book KGB, there were several operations by KGB (the Soviet secret intelligence agency):

One was aimed at sabotaging the oilfields and eventually subverting the government of Saudi Arabia. The KGB there had established and was attempting to sustain a terrorist guerrilla organization calling itself the Front of Liberation of Saudi Arabia. . . .The KGB also had begun to build cells of terrorists in the oil sheikdoms south of Kuwait, along the Persian Gulf. Here again it sought to wrest control of another source of Middle East oil vital to Eastern Europe and Japan. To attract future terrorists, the KGB held out to youths of these sheikdoms the lure of scholarships in the Soviet Union, where the most apt could be observed, recruited, and trained. Sakharov, a prominent KGB Middle East agent, noted that eighty young men from the sheikdom of Qatar alone had already been ferried clandestinely to Russia through Cairo. (Barron, 1975, p. 58)

In spite of the British official departure from the Gulf at the end of 1971, its presence is lingering. Joseph Sisco, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated, "When I say 'exodus' it is not a complete exodus, because bear in mind that Great Britain has a number of its officers in the armed forces in Oman, as well as in the federation forces of the United Arab Emirates" (U.S. Interests, 1972, p. 87).

When one examines the historical background of the Gulf and observes carefully the current events, one cannot help but attribute some of the blame to Great Britain for fueling instability in the region. However, there are also other factors, some of which have been mentioned briefly, that contribute to this unrest and instability. Again, several of these factors, consisting of border disputes and nationalistic clashes, might be considered side effects of the colonial heritage of the British presence.

Border disputes

After the British "withdrawal" in 1971, border disputes between the Gulf states became one of the most threatening elements to the stability of the area: Iraq's claim to Kuwait; Iran's dispute with Iraq over sovereignty in Shatt al-Arab; Iran's outstanding claim to Bahrain; Saudi Arabia's claim to the southern frontiers of Abu Dhabi and the Buraymi Oasis, parts of which were claimed by Abu Dhabi and Oman; and a common claim to the large sections of the Gulf median line that delineated offshore rights.

These disputes do not seem as serious as then thought to be. In 1971, Iran dropped its claim to Bahrain and instead occupied the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs. In the spring of 1973, Iraq, which has never dropped its claim to Kuwait, made menacing moves toward the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Buhayan, which command the channels to the Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr. After several weeks of tension, however, the issue subsided. Another thorny issue, the

territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi over their frontiers and over Buraymi Oasis, was finally settled in July 1974, when Saudi Arabia dropped its claim to Buraymi and gained a corridor to the sea for its oil field south of Abu Dhabi.

Nationalistic clashes

Traditional rivalries between Arabs and Persians coupled with the more recent policy differences are a continual source of friction. A clash of Iranian and Arab nationalism in the Gulf is exemplified by the heated disagreement as to the name of the Gulf: Persian or Arabian. This clash has religious overtones; Iranians are Shia Muslims and most of the Arabs are Sunni Muslims. An Arab minority in Iran and the Iranian loyalties of some groups on the Arab side of the Gulf tend to complicate this issue and to continue frictions. During Shah's rule, the Arabs did not take kindly to Iran's benign attitude toward Israel. Moreover, while the Shah saw Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia never accepted the role of junior partner in regional cooperation.

Political Threats

Conceptually, political factors exist in the Gulf which are potentially destabilizing. They include: the Arab-Iranian jousting for political pre-eminence in the Gulf; the possible spread of more serious radicalism in the whole region; the permeation of the new technocratic middle-class in the governmental superstructure; the

Arab-Israeli conflict; and the superpower intrusion.

Iran's role in the Gulf. "The Arabs," stated an Iranian political scientist, "cannot but see that if the 1950's and 1960's were the era of Nasser, the 1970's begin the era of the Shah" (Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 77). The Arabs have resented such statements and similar ones that reveal the Iranian imperial dreams in the area.

Because of its size and military and economic strength, the Iranians feel justified to play a major role in the Gulf. It is not yet clear whether the Irani revolutionary government has relinquished Iran's role of supremacy in the region.

Radicalism in the Gulf. Potentially more serious are the radicalizing movements indigenous to the Gulf region. The radical movements in Iraq, the ever present political threat of the Dhufari Rebellion, and the Marxist-Leninist regime in South Yemen are serious problems for the current rulers of the Gulf. Also of importance are the vocal though still unorganized workers in Bahrain and, probably of greatest impact, the spill-overs from the Irani Revolution of 1978.

The New Middle-Class. The influx of thousands of Gulf college graduates, from Western Europe and the U.S., will in a few years have a serious impact on the body-politic of the region. This will probably manifest itself in demands for political participation and a decentralized process for decision making on the national level. This "tidal wave" could eventually assert the direction and intensity of change to the path of gradual political reform.

Arab-Israeli Conflict. Over the past three decades, the Arab

Gulf rulers have been drawn into the Arab-Israeli conflict. This has taken place at various junctures.

First, liberation of most of the Arabic countries from the grip of the colonial era has drawn the Gulf region into the wider spectrum of Arabic politics. Second, the Gulf states were forced into the climate of political fervor that had been awakened by the charismatic leadership of President Nasser of Egypt during the 1950s and early '60s. Third, and most important, was the establishment of the Israeli entity in 1948 and the birth of the Palestinian problem. As a result of this establishment, over a million and a half Palestinian refugees were forced to flee to other Arabic countries. A large influx of these Palestinians were absorbed by the Gulf states due to the available financial opportunities. The Palestinian presence has been a constant reminder to the governments and peoples of the Gulf of the need to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Fourth, the 1967 war between Arabs and Israelis led to the emergence of the Palestinian (fedayeen) movements which have brought more winds of revolutionary ideas into the Gulf. Fifth, the Arab oil embargo of October 1973 was a direct reaction to the need for the resolution of this conflict.

What happens on the Arab-Israeli front will undoubtedly effect the Arab Gulf states. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the Saudis believe that "the main cause of instability" in the region was Israel, not the Soviet Union as claimed by Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State during his recent Middle East trip ("Haig Ends," 1981, p. A12).

Superpower Shadow. Since the British government announced in 1968 its intention to leave the Gulf, the superpowers have been trying to fill what is called the "vacuum" created by this departure. This has led the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to carry out more aggressive policies and to assume a greater posture in the area. This has included a large direct military presence in the Indian Ocean and a tremendous introduction of military hardware into the region through their perspective allies.

It is needless to say that the withering away and the resolution of these threats would substantially contribute to stability in the Gulf. There has been some evidence in the past few years, especially since the Iranian revolution, that few of these threats have been "tamed." Iraq has been following a more "moderate" path; the Dhufari Rebellion has been aborted militarily; rulers of different states have made some timely concessions in giving a somewhat larger role to the "new middle-class" in the building of the countries' infrastructures. Kuwait has recently reinstalled a parliament that had been dissolved in 1976, Bahrain has promised to reinstall its parliament, and Saudi Arabia has vowed to establish an advisory council ("Maglis el-Shura"). However, it is doubtful that the other main political threats, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict and the superpower intrusion in the region, will be resolved in the foreseeable future.

THE SOVIET INTRUSION

The increased international focus on the Gulf, the marked rise in recent years in Soviet sea power and in Soviet presence in the Middle East have stimulated considerable interest in, and speculation about, Soviet objectives in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states. Since the days of the Czar, the Soviet Union has had naval-maritime aspirations in the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular.

Geopolitical Interests

Beyond strategic and ideological considerations, the Soviet Union has been perceived to have a growing interest in the Middle East oil, most of which comes from the Gulf region (Berry, 1972, pp. 149-151). First, the U.S.S.R. provides more than half of the East European oil requirements, which are expected to rise substantially. Soviet control, or influence over, these oil supplies -- whether directly from the Middle East producers or indirectly through Soviet channels -- would be a powerful lever to retain Moscow's sway over Eastern Europe. Second, probably even more important, is the heavy dependence of Western Europe, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, the United States on the Gulf oil. Soviet hands on the oil spigots of the Gulf would give them a unique instrument for exploiting the fissures in the Western Alliance. Third, the interruption of oil supplies to NATO-Europe, the Sixth Fleet and other U.S. military forces in the theater would inevitably reduce NATO's defense capability and drastically narrow the range of options open to the Alliance in a crisis or war

situation. Even the Seventh Fleet operating in Southeast Asia receives some 75 percent of its black oil from the Gulf (Joshua, 1974, p. 62).

In short, the oil resources of the Gulf have added a major geopolitical dimension to Soviet concern with the region. However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "now predicts that during the 1980's Moscow will still meet its energy needs without having to import petroleum" (Gwerzman, 1981, p. A1). This is in contrast to the 1977 CIA assertion that Soviet domestic consumption was expected to outrun its production by 1985.

Difficulties

The most important diplomatic difficulty facing the Soviets in the Gulf is the fact that all the states on the Gulf--with the exception of Iraq--are very anti-communist. "Neither we nor the Shah of Iran nor the king of Saudi Arabia nor anyone else in this area, save possibly the Iraqis, believe it is possible to coexist with Russia," asserted an Omani Official, "any question of the Gulf states cooperating with Russia is like a foolish lamb offering to gambol on the hillside with a hungry lion" (Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 78).

Moscow has no diplomatic or commercial relations of any kind with Saudi Arabia and the four small states. It has an embassy and a little trade activity in Kuwait. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London, "Bahrain and Qatar rejected Soviet proposals to open diplomatic missions and an agreement in

principle by the Union of Arab Emirates (UAE) to accept a Soviet Embassy was not implemented" (The International Institute, 1973, p. 26).

Iran's relations with the Soviet Union, tense in the post-war period, was relaxed by the late Shah and reflected certain areas of mutual economic interest.

More than 90 industrial and national-economic facilities have been built or are now being built. . . .In turn, Iran is supplying the Soviet Union with industrial products, mineral raw materials and certain types of traditional goods required by U.S.S.R. economy. ("Foreign affairs," 1974, pp. 17-18).

This normalization of Iran's relations with the Soviet Union started in 1962 when "the Shah assured Moscow that he would allow no American missiles to be based on his territory, as they then were on Turkish territory" (Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 78). This normalization, however, did not diminish Iran's strong orientation toward and ties with the Western world.

Among the Gulf states, the U.S.S.R. has developed the most intimate relations with Iraq. The fifteen-year treaty of "friendship and cooperation" that was signed between the Soviet Union and Iraq on April 9, 1972, was allegedly concluded on Iraq's initiative. This agreement was more comprehensive than the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of the preceding year. Moscow has been Iraq's chief military supplier. Apart from the oil industry, Soviet economic and technical aid to Iraq included the building of factories for food processing and the manufacturing of textiles, glass and medicines.

Iraq is the Soviet's only military toehold in the Gulf. Soviet

war ships have used the facilities of the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. Iraq has denied strongly the Pentagon's allegations that the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr is a Russian base and has said that the aim of these statements is to justify the presence of American bases in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. Next to Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) is the closest to the Soviet Union. It is through PDRY that the U.S.S.R. gave military support to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). (See Novik, 1979, for a closer look at the Soviet relations with PDRY.)

For some years, the People's Republic of China has had a diplomatic presence in Iraq and in two Arabian Peninsula countries outside the Gulf: the Yemen Arab Republic and PDRY. China was effective in providing economic assistance to the two Yemens. In 1971, Iran and Kuwait established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Except for the support through South Yemen of the PFLO, there was no evidence of significant Chinese political activity in the Gulf region.

Presence in the Indian Ocean

Extensive literature has been written in recent years about the U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is not a central concern of the present study. Since the Soviet policy toward the Gulf cannot be wholly understood except in the larger perspective of the Indian Ocean, we shall at least have to mention the primary issue that seems to be disturbing the security planners in the

Kremlin.

The Gulf is not a good naval body. Its waters are too shallow, clear and confined for strategic vessels, either submarine or surface. Nevertheless, the Gulf, as an arm of the Indian Ocean, has been subtly influenced by the strategic rivalry of the superpowers that is currently threatening to develop in its open waters. In other words, the key to ending the cold war in the Gulf is to end it in the Indian Ocean.

In the age of missile submarines, the Arabian Sea which is the northwest portion of the Indian Ocean, must appear to the Pentagon watchers in Moscow even more menacing than does the eastern Mediterranean. From the Arabian Sea, most of the industrial Soviet far west (including Moscow and Central Asia, with its aerospace and missile development and production) and western Siberia fall within its range of Polaris submarines and Poseidon MIRV's.

In the mid-seventies, conflicting opinions about the strength of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean were published. Many of the military experts created a certain fear of the Soviet presence, reminding the Americans of the "new" Russian penetration.

Pravda (Soviet's official newspaper) tried to rebut these American fears:

In an effort to retain their positions in South Asia, imperialist circles in the West are building up their military presence in the Indian Ocean and are hastening to create new strongholds here. The British-American agreement on the construction of a U.S. military base on Diego Garcia is a pertinent example. As always, lies concerning Soviet "penetration" into this area and the construction of "Soviet

bases" here are serving as a propaganda screen for such actions. ("World politics," 1974, p. 16)

The U.S. News & World Report quoted from what it calls "top authorities", "As far as it knows, the Russians have no permanent, shore-based naval facilities in the region" ("Can Russia," 1974, p. 42). The fact remains that both superpowers are ambiguous about their military presence in the now very important Indian Ocean.

Aims

In the Gulf, the Soviet rulers have appeared to view the continued preferential military and oil-concessionary presence of Britain and the United States as wholly undesirable. Since the Soviet Union does not state all its purposes explicitly, the assessment of Moscow's real aims in the Gulf on the basis of propaganda and visible actions must remain speculative.

It is widely believed (and particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) that Moscow is in the Gulf to achieve a master plan for the seizure of all the oil in the Gulf -- that once the tap was securely in its grasp, Moscow would be able, even in peace-time, to turn it on or off at will, thus forcing the Western industrial states to their knees as the energy crisis deepened. Since such a development would almost certainly initiate a war with the United States and Western Europe, it must be ruled out as most unlikely. Others have viewed the undeniable Soviet efforts to join in the scramble of Gulf oil as evidence of a desire to secure sources of supply outside the U.S.S.R.

Those whom Moscow chose to aid -- leaders of PDRY, Iraq, and the Dhufar Rebellion -- were described in the Soviet press as people struggling against the American imperialists and their local lackeys. It was a struggle in which the "socialist world" and the "progressive forces of the third world" were natural allies. Ideology is important for Soviet policy in the long term, but practical foreign policy decisions emerge from a balancing of interests and priorities, of domestic and international factors, and of institutional pressures and personal differences. It is probably misleading to discuss whether the Soviet policy in the Gulf is motivated by a grand strategy or by opportunism. If the former, the strategy is flexible enough to avoid a timetable and to accept setbacks along the way, hoping to reverse them. If the latter, opportunities can be created as well as stumbled upon. The key question is whether the success won on the periphery of the Gulf could be extended to the center. In 1979 and 1980, tests were made in Iran and in Afghanistan: they are not conclusive.

In this junction, it is relevant to observe the general pattern of Soviet behavior. For a long time, Soviets have sought to expand their influence whenever it was safe to do so. That pattern has essentially continued in method. For example, in Angola and in Ethiopia, Cuban soldiers were utilized. In Ethiopia, there was a greater capability for airlift. In Afghanistan, the Soviets moved against what they thought to be a border security problem. But the pattern of Soviet behavior is essentially what it has been: it has been cautious, it takes advantages of opportunities, but it does not

display a wave of aggressiveness. In doing so, the Soviets have always sought to avoid direct involvement in a conflict with the West. There is no doubt about their concern about the danger of war.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN THE GULF

Interests

Richard Nixon (1980) dramatized the great importance of the Gulf when he stated, "More than ever, the question of who controls what in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East is the key to who controls what in the world" (p. 74).

In a statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee during hearings, Joseph Sisco, referred to the Gulf as an area in which "we have very, very significant political-economic-strategic interests" (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 6). When asked in an earlier hearing to define the United States interests in the Gulf, Sisco replied:

First, I think it is an important area strategically in the sense of it being a waterway, communications, freedom of transit. Second, I think it is an important area in economic terms, not only in the necessity of these oil resources being available to our Western European allies, but a good many of these oil resources being available to the United States where our resource requirements projected over the next decade or two can be expected to increase. Third, there are other economic interests that we have in terms of the opportunities for markets, our own advice, investment, and so on. (U.S. Interests, 1972, p. 85)

By far the most important U.S. interest in the Gulf is oil. As the U.S. thirst for oil increases, its dependence on imported oil increases (see Appendix I). According to the Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School:

The key contradiction is this: While the declared aim of American policy is to reduce the use of imported oil, the United States has in fact become more and more dependent upon it. Between 1973 and early 1979, U.S. oil imports

almost doubled, and had begun to provide almost half of the nation's oil. Unless the United States resolves the contradiction, it will be even more dependent on imported oil in the 1980's. (Stoyangh & Yergin, 1979, p. 2)

This thirst for imported oil was coupled with the decline of domestic oil production to make the U.S. more dependent on the Middle East oil, and particularly the Gulf oil. This was evident from the amount of oil imported by the U.S. from Saudi Arabia which rose steadily from 168.5 million barrels in 1973 to 256 million in 1975 (Congressional Quarterly, 1979a, p. 5-A).

Moreover, it was reported by the National Academy of Science that the U.S. did not have the amount of undiscovered oil and natural gas that it thought it had ("Why Shah," 1975, p. 3).

By 1973, the Gulf had become a significant market for the U.S. exports from the standpoint of growth rate and trade balance (see Appendix J). In a statement before a House Subcommittee, Marinus Van Gessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Commerce, said:

Since 1970 our exports to this area have increased on the average about 35 percent annually, greater than for any major world geographic area except Eastern Europe. We also continue to run a substantial trade surplus with these countries, our exports traditionally being more than double our imports (although this ratio is narrowing now with our stepped up imports of Persian Gulf crude oil). (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 175)

To the U.S., the Gulf became an area where "it makes a difference" -- to use Nixon's term. Therefore, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, declared in an interview, "The Persian Gulf is an area of very great strategic significance. It is a matter

of utmost importance for the security of the West that the Gulf remains secure" ("Can Russia," 1974, p. 43).

When the above factors are combined with the almost complete Western European dependence on the Middle East and especially the Gulf oil, one can appreciate the true significance of the Gulf to the U.S.

An Instrument of Control

U.S. oil companies are predominant in the region. Western Europe and Japan clearly have been vulnerable due to their heavy dependence on Gulf oil. By 1972 Japan and Western Europe imported most of their oil needs from the Gulf while U.S. imported only five percent. This has provided the United States with an effective instrument of control over them, or if one prefers, "a close leash." This became evident as the events of the "energy crisis" of 1973 unfolded.

The relationship over the last decade between the United States and its erstwhile allies in the industrialized capitalist world has been one of increasing tension and competition in the economic and political spheres. For one thing, Western Europe's emergence as a major economic entity through the European Economic Community (EEC) made it serious competition for the United States. For another, Japanese textiles, steel, automobiles, and electrical equipment carved out larger and larger sections of the U.S. market. There was much talk about the "Japanese miracle" and soon-to-be "Japanese super-power."

Higher oil prices of 1973 did not fundamentally originate in

decisions made by OPEC nations but in the changing conditions of international competition. The "energy crisis" erupted before the October war. It reflects the long-term drive of the United States to raise world oil prices. Oil economist M. A. Adelman of Massachusetts Institute of Technology stated his belief that the steep price increases can be attributed to U.S. capitulation to OPEC during negotiations over the Tehran agreement.

Adelman (1973) observed, "Without active support from the U.S., OPEC might never have achieved much" (p. 86). He termed a January 1971 meeting in Paris of oil-importing nations the "turning point" and said that,

there is no doubt that the American representatives and the oil companies assured the other government that if they offered no resistance to higher oil prices they could at least count on five years' secure supply at stable or only slightly rising prices. (p. 88)

The role of the U.S. in the oil prices was confirmed by the U.S. government itself at a forum at Yale University in late November 1974. The government representative was Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs. Enders was regarded by insiders as "the chief architect of Secretary of State Kissinger's energy policy." According to The New York Times, Enders broke "startling" news. The news, "startling against the background of repeated declarations of high American officials that OPEC nations must reduce their exorbitantly high prices -- is that the United States is now founding its strategy on the \$11 price." Enders explained that such a high price was necessary to protect "heavy American and other Western

investment in the development of alternative energy sources, based on the assumption of a continued 'real' oil price of \$11 a barrel" (Silk, 1974, pp. 51; 59).

In both the political and economic realm, the energy crisis strengthened and enhanced the U.S. position vis-a-vis Europe. Politically, it was not a sheer coincidence that "the changes in government in Germany, and particularly in Britain and France, brought to power leaders more favorably disposed toward cooperation with the United States than their predecessors" (Szyliowicz & O'Neill, 1975, p. 193). Within the economic realm the increased difference between the United States and Europe is even more obvious. Although some weaknesses in her economic position have been revealed by this crisis, the United States nevertheless emerged as comparatively stronger than her allies.

Her high degree of self-sufficiency in the field of energy and most raw materials, her position as an exporter of many scarce goods including foodstuffs, and the obvious strengthening of the dollar in comparison with the almost unmanageable balance-of-payments deficits in many European countries have reconfirmed if not strengthened the position of the United States as the strongest economic power in the world. That position may well be enhanced by the likelihood of Arab reserves being rechannelled into the Western economy primarily through the American economy. (Kaiser, 1975, p. 21)

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the conclusion reached by a noted Middle East observer, John Campbell, was that:

the United States had placed its reliance on what was known as the 'two-pillar system' (the pillars being Saudi Arabia and Iran) to maintain stability and security. After the shocks of 1973 that system responded to the interests of those two nations and the United States. (Campbell, 1978, p. 627)

Policies

Despite obvious political, economic and strategic implications emanating from interests in oil, the Gulf did not come into focus as a specific area of the United States policy until 1968 when the British Government announced its intentions of "phasing out" its presence from "East of Suez" by 1971. Prior to that time the U.S. had developed close relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two largest states in the area, and maintained good relations with Kuwait. Under a leasing agreement with the British, a small naval installation was stationed at Bahrain. For the maintenance of the price and flow of oil, however, the U.S. depended to a great degree on the major oil companies; and for the maintenance of political security in the Gulf, the U.S. depended mainly on Great Britain.

Iran had long been a prime recipient of U.S. military assistance, hardware, and training as a "forward defense" country on the perimeter of the Soviet Union. Between 1946 and 1967 nearly \$1.5 billion worth of military assistance had been given to Iran. Some 2,000 Iranian officers had received training in the U.S. Washington helped set up SAVAK -- the State Organization for Intelligence and Security -- and also set up police and gendarme missions. By the mid-60s one friendly observer noted that the Shah "had established . . . a police state even more efficient than his father's" (Hurewitz, 1969, p. 287).

It was in 1965 that a new phase in U.S. military aid to Iran began. The U.S. began to send highly sophisticated air and naval weaponry at the rate of \$94 million per year. Iranian defense expen-

ditures as a percentage of a growing GNP began to climb sharply, from 4.8% in 1963-64 to 8.5% in 1971. The decision to sell Iran several squadrons of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers was made in 1966 (the decision to send Phantoms to Israel was not taken until 1968). In 1968, the Johnson Administration agreed to supply Iran with \$600 million in modern arms over the next five years, which Iranian sources confirmed would be used to maintain "stability" in the Gulf (Dishon, 1973, pp. 83-84). A naval base at Bandar Abbas on the Straits of Hormuz was expanded with the Export-Import Bank assistance (Szulc, 1971, p. 1; 2). A new Third Army Corps, complete with paratroop units, was announced for deployment in Shiraz, Iran's major southern city (Burrell & Cottrell, 1972, p. 213). This policy of relying on Iran as the primary power in the Gulf was not without its problems, to be sure. The potential for a clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia was brought home in February 1968 when an Iranian gunboat arrested the Saudi and American members of an ARAMCO -- the Arabian American Oil Company -- crew drilling in disputed Gulf waters. An unscheduled secret visit to Tehran by Under-Secretary of State Rostow kept that affair under wraps. Rostow also prevailed upon the American oil companies in the Middle East to raise production sharply in Iran rather than the other Gulf states in order to provide the Shah with the foreign exchange necessary for his massive arms purchases (Stork, 1975, pp. 140, 142).

When Nixon and Kissinger came to power in 1969 and conducted their review of U.S. foreign policy, they found the guidelines and

even the specifics for policy in the Gulf already laid out (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 39). At least as far as the Gulf was concerned, the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 represented not innovation but continuity with a new added intensity.

U.S. policy in the Gulf as it developed after 1968 attempted to reconcile U.S. concern for the "security" of the area with the judgment that the U.S. public would not support a direct security role there. Nixon (1980) recalled, with some disappointment:

Unfortunately, this came [Britain's 1968 announcement] at a time when outcries against the war in Vietnam raised serious questions about whether the American public would support another major American commitment in a distant trouble spot such as the Persian Gulf. (p. 82)

The emphasis of "security" in overall U.S. Gulf policy was reflected in a statement of "five principles" by Joseph Sisco (1972) in a congressional hearing:

- Noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations.
- Encouragement of regional cooperation for peace and progress.
- Supporting friendly countries in their efforts to provide for their own security and development.
- The principles enunciated at the Moscow summit of avoiding confrontations in such areas of the World.
- Encouraging the international exchange of goods, services, and technology. (p. 242)

These "five principles" were part of the first and the most widely quoted policy statement on the Gulf by the United States Government.

In his statement, Sisco (1972) noted:

We share with these two countries [Iran and Saudi Arabia] a strong mutual interest in the stability and orderly progress of the region, as do Western European states and Japan....We all share an interest in an orderly, expanding marketplace insulated insofar as possible from ideologically motivated disruptions. (pp. 242-243)

Aside from these "ideologically motivated disruptions," the U.S. saw the threats to "stability" of the area in terms of: "regional conflicts between the neighboring states," the "virus of the Arab-Israeli conflict," and the Soviet threat addressed indirectly in the fourth "principle" (Sisco, 1972, p. 242). Initially the Soviet threat was not stated clearly. However, one could share the conclusion reached by David E. Long (1975) that:

the primary Soviet threat to American Interests in the Gulf and Indian Ocean region was seen more in political than in military terms, and included potential Soviet support for local subversive groups. (p. 71)

Approximately one year after Sisco's 1972 statement, James Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East, Africa and South Asian Affairs, stated U.S. security interests in the Gulf:

- (1) Containment of Soviet military power within its present borders;
- (2) access to Persian Gulf oil; and
- (3) continued free movement of United States ships and aircraft into and out of the area. (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 39).

This main emphasis on the containment of Soviet "intrusion" in the Gulf was reflected later by Kissinger. Kissinger's (1979) conception was that the Shah should "fill the vacuum left by British withdrawal, now menaced by Soviet intrusion and radical momentum" (p. 1264). The arguments about Soviet presence in the Gulf-Indian Ocean area was disputed by CIA Chief William Colby who told Congress that the Soviets were just responding to U.S. initiatives (Manning, 1975, p. 21).

As a result of its failure in Vietnam, the U.S. was unable to

replace the British in the Gulf "directly." This disability led the U.S. to employ more of an "indirect" replacement. The above "five principles" provided the conceptual framework for a policy of political support and indirect security assistance with a minimum U.S. presence beyond the military training missions already in place in Iran and Saudi Arabia. The policy relied heavily on cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and became known informally as the "two pillar policy," or in a broader context, "regional cooperation." It also relied on close cooperation with the British, who were expected to continue a major, though in time diminishing, internal security role in Oman and the Gulf Sheikhdoms. Sisco elaborated in a lengthy but revealing statement:

From our point of view, we have had a very clear-cut policy, and if there is one area we have looked at very carefully in the last 4 years, it is this Persian Gulf area, because we anticipated the British exodus and we asked ourselves: What is it that the United States can do, consistent with the Nixon doctrine, to make a major contribution toward stability in the area without ourselves getting directly involved, because this is an area obviously in which we have very, very significant political-economic strategic interests.

What we decided was that we would try to stimulate and be helpful to the two key-countries in this area -- namely, Iran and Saudi Arabia -- that, to the degree to which we could stimulate cooperation between these two countries, they could become the major element of stability as the British were getting out, as there was created a federation of the United Arab Emirates and as independence came to Bahrain. (New Perspectives, 1973, pp. 5-6)

The close and intricate relationship between the United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia led U.S. policy-makers to see the main threat to the Gulf "Security" coming from the Soviets and from the radical political movements working to overthrow the monarchies. United

States policy was directed toward suppressing those movements, using and strengthening the monarchical regimes to guard against the possibility of a Libyan-type coup. This was evident in Sisco's (1972) statement:

Most governments of the gulf are friendly to the United States and welcome commercial and cultural contracts. Our policy toward the area is designed to support these governments in maintaining their independence and assuring peace, progress, and regional cooperation. (p. 242)

During 1971-1973, the foundation of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf was fully laid. Military and security assistance was stepped up to Saudi Arabia and particularly to Iran.

However, in contrast to the policy statements of the Department of State, very sober policy recommendations came in 1972 by the House Subcommittee on the Near East. For their significant perceptions, the most important of these recommendations are cited at length in the following:

First, United States relations with the states of the Persian Gulf should continue to be practical and low-key....

Second, we should maintain good contacts with the leadership based not so much on large, permanent presence, as on regular occasional visits by high level United States Officials. . . .

Third, we ought to expand our economic and political relations outside the oil industry. This will broaden the scope of our relations to help these states prepare for the day when their economies will need to be diversified because they can no longer expand their oil output.

Finally, the success of a prudent, low-key policy and the ability of the United States to adjust to rapid changes in an unstable area will depend, in part, on an adequate consideration and assessment in the United States Government of the area, its problems and our policies. . . .

At the same time, four specific policies should be avoided.

First, we should avoid projecting a negative policy of

telling leaders what they should and should not do or otherwise resort to persuasion for support of these states on international issues of no immediate interests to these states. These states should proceed at their own pace internationally.

Second, we should not seek to replace the British in the Gulf or fill any so-called "vacuum." A low profile is an essential prerequisite to keeping the potentially unstable Gulf area out of any sphere of great power. . . .

While the Soviet Union would like to, and probably will, increase its influence in this area, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union is embarked on a grand scheme to control the oil faucets of the Persian Gulf. . . .

Third, in an area of many and overlapping regional and intracountry disputes, we should not become identified too closely with any state, because then its causes might well become our causes. This is particularly true of Iran and Saudi Arabia. . . .

However, the United States should not let its desire for good relations with any state suggest a preference for the domination of the Gulf by that state. . . .

We are currently seeking, but should not force, this type of cooperation among states which harbor some deep-seated animosities against each other.

Fourth, the United States should avoid, where possible, becoming too closely identified with particular individual leaders and instead depend on maintaining a close rapport with both leaders and technocrats in these states. (The United States, 1972, pp. 12-13)

In retrospect, these recommendations represented, probably, the wisest course that the United States policy in the Gulf could have taken. They embodied the earliest official criticisms voiced against the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf.

The Arms Sales

The U.S. arms sale push was begun in the early sixties, but any favorable effect on the payments deficit was soon submerged under a wave of Vietnam spending, which eventually combined with a deteriorating trade balance to produce an economic crisis of major proportions in 1971. As a result of these factors and structural weaknesses in the U.S. economy, arms sales have assumed an important role in both the economic and military facets of the Nixon Doctrine.

As was mentioned previously, after the British withdrawal from "East of Suez," responsibility for "maintaining stability" in the Gulf area passed to the two major oil producing states, Iran and Saudi Arabia. To the U.S. this was a necessary step to counter a possible radical or Soviet action.

This need for strong regional powers to "maintain stability" coupled with the U.S. reluctance -- in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine -- to station troops in the area produced an enormous upsurge in arms sales to the region. This massive arms buildup in Saudi Arabia and particularly Iran was in part a logical extension of the Nixon Doctrine and of the U.S. assistance effort in those countries, which had been going on for over two decades. As the Doctrine was explained in 1970 by David Packard, the Deputy Secretary of Defense:

The best hope of reducing our overseas involvements and expenditures lies in getting allied and friendly nations to do even more in their own defense. To realize that hope, however, requires that we must continue, if requested, to give or sell them the tools they need for this bigger load we are urging them to assume. (Klare, 1974, p. 48)

Thus, the American arms industry, with declining orders from the Pentagon, could already expect some relief through orders from other countries. At the time, the Nixon Doctrine was welcomed with relief by most politicians as the means of extricating American troops from South-East Asia. But it was really a gamble of extraordinary rashness, for it assumed that allies who had this new freedom to buy arms would use them wisely, in the Western interest. And the stakes of the gamble were soon to be abruptly raised.

In 1971 the United States foreign trade balance showed a deficit for the first time since 1893. The need for exports was now far more urgent than ten years before, when the Defense Department had first unleashed the Pentagon's salesmen. The aerospace slump and unemployment added to the crisis.

Nixon and Kissinger both tended to regard arms selling as an extension of diplomacy, in the nineteenth-century tradition. The humiliation of Vietnam, and America's weakened economy, had engendered more skeptical and short-term diplomatic attitudes, treating arms as counters in the world's game with which to bargain for settlement or to placate client-states.

The recovery of the arms industry was thus already under way in 1972, which culminated in Nixon's re-election. But the real take-off began a year later with the oil price hike of 1973. The quadrupling of the oil price brought a surge of wealth to the states of the Gulf, led by Iran and Saudi Arabia. For any nation faced with sudden wealth, arms provided the easiest and quickest way to spend money,

bringing prestige and new authority to the rulers. Hospitals, schools and welfare provided huge problems of administration and social disruption while arms companies brought their own infrastructure and training, making links with high technology which rulers longed for.

Following the withdrawal of most of the British military presence, the region that was then said to be a "power vacuum" was rapidly becoming one of the world's most heavily armed areas. Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, asserted:

While we may be unsure of the implications and significance of these sales, we are conscious that arms sales are playing a predominant role in the Persian Gulf policy that our Government has shaped in the last couple of years. (The Persian Gulf, 1974, p. 1)

The defence budgets of Iran and Saudi Arabia rose from about \$1.5 billion in 1972 to about \$13 billion in 1975. Iran alone became among the top fifteen nations in world defense expenditures. If the quantity of this build-up was impressive, so was its nature. Iran was likely to deploy the fastest generation of American fighters even before these aircrafts became available to the American allies in Europe. By 1974, the percentage of the worldwide total of U.S foreign military sales deliveries to the Gulf countries, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait exceeded those to NATO countries.

In speaking about this huge U.S. arms sale to the Gulf, Hamilton said, "The figures of this enormous business speak for themselves," then continued:

The U.S. MAAG Mission in Iran is one of the largest in the world. Persian Gulf states account for perhaps as much as \$6

billion of the total U.S. arms sales overseas in fiscal year 1974 of the over \$8 billion Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has said we sold. That worldwide figure compares with a fiscal year 1973 figure of between \$3 and \$4 billion of which over \$2 billion went to Iran alone. (The Persian Gulf, 1974, p. 1)

Table 1. Foreign Military Sales Deliveries
(percentage of worldwide total)

	Fiscal year -				
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
NATO countries	44	43	45	32	23
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait . . .	10	7	18	24	24

Source: United States Arms, 1975, p. 5.

When we compare the arms deliveries of the U.S. to the Gulf and those of the other suppliers, namely the United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R., then we can appreciate the scope of the American involvement in this region. Here we also find the figures astonishing.

Table 2. Arms Deliveries to the Gulf
countries, 1970-75

United Kingdom	\$ 1.83 billion
France	1.67 billion
U.S.S.R.	<u>600.5 million</u>
Total	\$ 4.1 billion
United States	7.94 billion

Source: United States Arms, 1975, p. 6.

Therefore, when Lt. General H. M. Fish, Jr., Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, told a House subcommittee that

U.S. Arms Sales abroad totalled \$9-10 billion in 1975 and that 80 percent of these sales went to the Middle East, a congressman told him, "You're building the biggest firecracker in history" ("Pentagon's Arms," 1975, p. 12).

Table 3. U.S. Foreign Military Sales and Orders to the Persian [Arabian] Gulf Countries, 1950-75
(thousands of dollars)

	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Oman	Saudi Arabia	Total
1950-69	647,497	13,152			161,468	822,117
1970	113,284				14,854	128,138
1971	396,613				95,845	492,428
1972	528,022				342,295	870,317
1973	2,108,787		53		83,984	2,192,824
1974	3,917,121		30,400		2,539,408	6,486,929
1975	2,567,903		370,496	1,613	1,373,862	4,313,974
TOTAL	10,279,227	13,152	400,949	1,613	4,611,686	15,306,627

Source: Berman, 1976, p. 100.

These weapons sales were justified by the United States as mainly necessary to bring "stability" to the area and to deter all radical movements. Hamilton refuted this argument:

Several justifications for our arms policies were presented to the subcommittee by the State Department and the Defense Department during these hearings. . .but these explanations do not dispel several doubts. The Soviet-backed threats to Iran and Saudi Arabia supposedly emanating from South Yemen and Iraq may be real, but they are small and potential. You do not need a sledge hammer to crack a nut. Since 1965, our sales of arms and services to Iran and Saudi Arabia are roughly six times estimates of Soviet activity in the Persian Gulf area. (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 8)

Obviously, the underlying purpose of these arms sales has been an effort to sop up surplus petrodollars available in every state in the Gulf. This was evident in a statement made in 1975 by Alfred L.

Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He stated an "additional objective" of the United States policy in the Gulf:

There is now, however, an additional objective in light of the vast increase in oil revenues, and that is to assist and encourage the countries of the region to recycle their surplus revenues into the world economy in an orderly and non-disruptive manner. (The Persian Gulf, 1974, p. 85)

Did the United States have an arms sales policy in the Gulf?

This was answered by a report of a special study mission (United States Arms, 1975) during May 1975 to examine U.S. arms sales to the Gulf. The report concluded:

Unfortunately, a U.S. arms policy has not developed as quickly as the sales themselves. Our policy is nonpolicy. . . .In Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, I encountered a shadow of a U.S. arms sales policy based on a dollars and cents approach. (p. 8)

Among the various explanations heard in Washington was that "stability" in the Gulf is essential to U.S. interests, and that in order to achieve it such countries as Iran and Saudi Arabia must be militarily powerful beyond challenge. Nobody opposes the first part of this argument, but there are many doubts about its corollary. In other words, what is questioned is whether the concept of a strong Iran or Saudi Arabia did not go beyond the realm of reason and thus become a danger. This was affirmed in the conclusion reached by the special study mission (United States Arms, 1975), "Military weaponry sales which are designed to promote stability may actually have the opposite effect and undermine security" (p. 13).

It took only about three years to prove the validity of this argument: with eruption of Iran in 1978. As a noted observer (Ramazani, 1979) of the Gulf concluded, "However one evaluates the diverse cause of the Iranian revolution, there is little doubt that these unrestrained arms transactions contributed to its outbreak" (p. 824).

THE SHAH'S ROLE

Father and Son

Far from being a hereditary monarch, his Imperial Majesty the late Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah-an-Shah [King of Kings], was the son of Reza Kahn, a cavalry officer -- an illiterate until adulthood -- who provided the military support for a coup in 1921 against the reigning Qajar dynasty. Reza Kahn took the name Pahlavi -- the name of the ancient Persian language -- as an act of public relations when he crowned himself Shah. His choice of the name Pahlavi was highly significant. It symbolized his desire both to associate himself with the glories of Iran's past and to give a sense of legitimacy to the dynasty. Pahlavi was the language spoken by the Parthians who ruled Persia after Alexander the Great and is considered to be the basis of the present Persian language. The need to justify the existence and legitimacy of the Pahlavi dynasty had been a continuing theme. It was less so with Reza Shah and was more pronounced with his son.

One cannot allow the desire to found a durable dynasty obscure achievements performed. Reza Shah restored a sense of national dignity and laid the ground work for a modern state by establishing a civil service and a proper army. He also broke the power of the tribal chieftains who in the past had made government authority a fiction in many provinces. Reza Shah held the same powers as Mustapha Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and he used them to the same ends, yet with one major difference. He did not secularize Iran, perhaps because he

wished to retain the importance of the Shiia Moslem beliefs that had given Iran its special Islamic character, or because he realized that he risked provoking the opposition of the powerful mullahs, the religious leaders. As it was, many traditional Iranians considered him contemptuous of religion since he made his belief known that the clergy was a brake on modernization. His son observed later, "If he had not treated them [the clergy] somewhat roughly; it might have taken three or four times as long as it did to carry out his programme of modernising the country" (Pahlavi, 1974, p. 35).

Shiism has had a definite hierarchy of religious authorities that have stood apart from the governmental claim of command. Two particularly important concepts -- the right to revolt against unjust rulers, and the existence of organized religious power centers outside state authority -- were more strongly developed in Shiia Islam than they were in the majoritarian Sunni sect. Shiism is at the same time more mystical and more devoted to charismatic leadership. As early as the 680s A.D., Shiia mullahs were fermenting revolutions in order to build a new order of social justice. They justified their uprisings by the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed:

At the end of time there will be tyrannical amirs, vicious viziers, treacherous judges, and lying jurists. Whoever lives to that time should not serve them, not as inspector, nor as collector, nor as treasurer, nor as policeman. (Lewis, 1974, p. 207)

Reza Shah quickly became a dictator, using the threat of Soviet subversion, the need for powerful rule and the sheer force of his personality. In the end, Reza Shah was destroyed by events larger

than himself. His country and its oil fields had become of major significance to Britain. In 1941 Allied troops moved into Iran, forcing his abdication. His son, Mohammed, who was aged only twenty-one, was placed on the throne, as a virtual puppet of the Allies.

Mohammed Reza Shah was an altogether more complex character than his father. He began life as a commoner, born a twin with his sister Ashraf on October 26, 1919. At the time of his father's coronation he was almost 11 years old. From that time on, as the Crown Prince, he led a protected, rarefied existence. He was singled out to learn the rules of kingship from his gruff, intimidating father. Mohammed Reza Shah was a sickly child who narrowly escaped dying of typhoid. He was of slighter build than his father and seems to have developed a complex about his size.

Reza Shah had a down-to-earth view of things; his son claimed to have visions (Pahlavi, 1974, pp. 54-55). Reza Shah saw himself as a patriot; his son went beyond this and sought to give his rule a sense of "divine mission." He found evidence of this divine mission in his amazingly lucky escapes from at least one dangerous air crash and five known assassination attempts.

When you think I've been wounded by a good five bullets. . . You have to believe in miracles. I've had so many air disasters, and yet I've always come out unscathed -- thanks to a miracle willed by God and the prophets. (Fallaci, 1977, p. 269)

Mohammed Reza Shah had the benefit of a proper education, with selected sons of high officials in Tehran and later with the sons of wealthy Europeans at Le Rosey in Switzerland. By his own account it

was an important experience; it opened his eyes to a wider world. His Swiss schooling created an admiration and fascination with Western culture, technology and institutions. But he maintained a strong, almost chauvanistic, attachment to the values and traditions of Iran.

This ambivalence towards Western culture became more pronounced with time and lay behind his assertion that a regenerated Iran would soon take its place among the world's industrial powers in the Great Civilization. It also explains his desire to justify his authoritarian system of government. He made a revealing statement to Oriana Fallaci (1977):

Believe me, when three quarters of a nation doesn't know how to read or write, you can provide for reforms only by the strictest authoritarianism -- otherwise you get nowhere. If I hadn't been harsh, I wouldn't even have been able to carry out agrarian reform and my whole reform programme would have stalemated. (p. 273)

He regarded the monarch's role as being a combination of a father figure, a revolutionary innovator, and a patriotic leader. These views are not alien to Iran's political culture and history. Amin Alimard and Cyrus Elahi (1976) observed, "As one reads Iranian history, it becomes clear that most often the whole society was ruled as if it were the personal possession of the King" (p. 217).

The fundamental nature of monarch has varied little since Cyrus the Great proclaimed himself King of Persian in 546 B.C. Continuity has been maintained not so much by heredity as by those who have had the strength and the will to gain power. Success conferred its own legitimacy and was the best guarantee of staying in power. The institution survived because it was the most effective means of wielding

authority. For the most part, monarchs were rarely enlightened and were generally despotic:

A significant part of that heritage has been a relatively centralized, authoritarian monarchy that used agricultural surpluses to maintain its army and bureaucracy, leaving the majority of the people powerless, illiterate and poor. (Alimard et al., 1976, p. 218)

To this extent, Mohammed Reza Shah was an extension of Iran's political culture and history.

A Dual-Objective

The Shah's overriding objectives were twofold. First was to fulfill his dreams of grandeur and empire. Second was to fulfill the role of the policeman in the Gulf, a role that was self-assumed and assigned to him in the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, by the U.S. Therefore, to understand the Shah's policies is to understand this oscillation between the fulfillment of his dream of grandeur and the fulfillment of his assigned and self-assumed role.

The Shah developed four secondary objectives. The first of these was the development of offshore oil fields. The second was to secure and protect shipments of oil from possible disruption by the revolutionary segments in the Gulf. The third was to maintain the status quo in the Gulf by suppressing revolutionary movements of the Gulf. The fourth concerned the stability of the Pahlavi regime. Iran was not insulated, as the Shah well knew, from the kind of political violence which cost Imam Mohammad al-Badr his throne in Yemen in 1962.

Iran is the world's third largest oil producer. It has more than 30 million people, and a relatively large quantity of arable land. Its mineral resources, principally copper, may be potentially as valuable as its oil.

To the Shah, economic and military development were for one purpose -- the grandeur of Iran. He made his overall objectives clear: to make Iran by the end of this century one of the the richest nations in the world; to achieve a "European" standard of living, comparable to that of France and Britain; and to achieve military power so great that "they will take account of us" as the paramount power in the region of the Gulf and as one of two or three great powers in the Indian Ocean, being no longer a "client" but a partner of the United States.

It would serve little purpose to make an inventory of Iran's resources, wealth, and projects beyond perhaps noting the following key factors: by 1976, Iran earned about \$20 billion in oil revenues and by 1975 its foreign exchange reserves already amounted to \$7.5 billion. As early as 1972, and before the high rise of the price of oil in 1973, Iran's state secretary for finance, Hassan Ali Mehran, estimated the country's earnings from crude exports for the period covered by the five year (1973-1977) plan would amount to \$108,000 (Schultz, 1972, p. 25).

The United States decided to rely on Iran to preserve Western interests in the Gulf. Iran was chosen to play this role because it offered several distinctive features which other regimes lacked. As

formulated by Sisco (1972),

Iran, by virtue of its population, its economic and military strength, and its geographic position along the northern shore of the Persian Gulf, is destined to play a major role in providing for stability in the gulf and the continued flow of oil to consumer countries. (p. 244)

In an interview with Newsweek, the Shah asserted his assigned and self-assumed role in the Gulf:

Not only do we have national and regional responsibilities but also a world role as guardian and protector of 60 percent of the world's oil reserves. . .The Nixon doctrine says the U.S. will help those who help themselves. That's what we're doing.

European security is sheer mockery without stability and security in the Persian Gulf. Western Europe, the U.S. and Japan see the Gulf as an integral part of their security, yet they are not in a position to ensure that security. That's why we're doing it for them. (De Borchgrave, 1973, p. 43)

American policy makers were always careful in public to stress the role of Saudi Arabia as well as Iran in maintaining regional "stability," but in fact the Saudi armed forces were in no way prepared to undertake an expansionist role similar to Iran's. In 1972, the London Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that "Saudi Arabia's armed forces are not well placed to assert the country's authority outside it's borders" (The Institute for Strategic, 1972, p. 40). Thus American military assistance to the Saudi regime throughout this period was designed to beef up its defenses and its internal security capabilities. (See New Perspectives, 1973, p. 44 for the list of U.S.-Saudi military agreements.)

This "foggy" dichotomy between the Irani and Saudi Arabian "roles" was evident in Nixon's (1980) latest work:

Rather than replace the British presence with a direct American presence, therefore, the United States chose to rely on local powers, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia, to provide security for the Gulf, while we assisted by making arms and other supplies available. . . .The Shah provided the muscle that protected the rich but vulnerable Saudis. . . .When the British left in 1971 only Iran had the trained manpower, the resources, and the will to take over Britain's stabilizing role. (pp. 82-84)

Arms, Money, Influence

In order to fulfill his dreams of grandeur and his "assigned" role, the Shah embarked on building an enormous arsenal. He also spread his influence internationally by using his vast oil revenues.

According to The Guardian,

France, for example, obtained \$1,000 millions deal....Tehran has given loans amounting to \$3,000 million to Italy; \$1,200 millions to Britain, \$1,000 millions to Egypt to help rebuild the Suez Canal, and several hundreds of millions of dollars to India and Pakistan. Iran also has given \$1,000 millions to the World Bank. (Quatrepoint, 1974, p. 13)

Smaller amounts were pledged to Sudan, Tunisia, Senegal, Jordan, Syria, and Morocco.

The Shah knew that military power goes hand in hand with political power. He doubled and tripled the strength of his armed forces. Undeniably, Iran became one of the world's major military powers.

The Iranian navy became the strongest naval power in the Gulf and it wished to extend its influence to the Indian Ocean as well. According to a statement by the Shah, Chah Bahar was to be expanded into an army, navy and air base larger than that of any other power on the Indian Ocean (Meister, 1973, p. 16).

The so-called "Iran's new window on the Gulf and the Indian

Ocean," Bandar Abbas -- situated at the narrowest point of the Straits of Hormuz -- became the base for Iran's military Hovercraft (Hovercraft is a military vehicle that scuds over water on its cushion of air and is faster than any conventional ship). "He [Shah] has ordered more of them to keep watch over what goes in and out the Gulf and to make Iran the world's leading military Hovercraft power" (Schmidt, 1975, p. 5).

Sisco was certainly accurate when he said in June 1973 that "the arms assistance arrangement being discussed with Iran and Saudi Arabia are not knee-jerk reactions of the last few to a so-called energy crisis, as some contend" (New Perspectives, 1973, p. 3). Nevertheless, it is also true that American arms policy toward Iran escalated sharply into a new phase in 1972-73. President Nixon stopped off in Tehran in May 1972, making a substantial detour from his route from Kiev to Warsaw, and promised the Shah to make available to Iran the most sophisticated weapons already in the U.S. inventory or planned for production. Soon after the Nixon visit, Pentagon salesmen-generals arranged to brief their Iranian counterparts and the Shah himself on the virtue of such modern armaments as the F-14 and F-15 fighter-bombers. (See U.S. Military, 1976 for more data on U.S. arms sales to Iran.)

As discussed earlier, the U.S. was actively involved in the Gulf arms build-up. The type and sophistication of the armaments held by the leading Gulf powers reflected deliberate effort to make Iran the strongest military power in the area. In fact, it was said that one

of the last major arms deals with Iran included "most everything short of atomic weapons," and in 1974, it was reported that Washington was even selling laser-guided bombs to Tehran (Weinraub, 1973, p. 3).

According to the previously mentioned report (United States Arms, 1975) submitted to the House Committee on International Relations:

In 1975, Iran spent almost 28 percent of its total budget on defense while Saudi Arabia devoted 10 percent of its budget to defense. Using the most recent figures available for Iraq, in 1974 that country spent around 8 percent of its budget on defense. Defense spending in Saudi Arabia increased by 450 percent between 1972 and 1975. Defense spending in Iran has increased during the same period by an even larger 1,100 percent. (pp. 13-14)

Under the Nixon administration the U.S. became committed, or rather entangled, in a way it had not been before. By permitting the Iranian purchase of sophisticated equipment in unprecedented quantities, the U.S. committed itself to make this hardware operational. This meant an exposed profile in the form of extensive military and civilian technical and advisory personnel in Iran to compensate for the serious shortage of Iranian skilled manpower. By 1976 it was reckoned that the majority of the 24,000 Americans in Iran were defense and defense-related. Before the revolution, this number had been expected to reach between 50,000 and 60,000 by 1980, largely as a result of the purchase of arms from the U.S. (U.S. Military, 1976, p. viii). Such being Iranian dependence on expatriate personnel, it was asserted (U.S. Military, 1976, p. 50) that she would be unable to fight on a day-to-day basis without American support through the late 1980's.

The credibility of the Iranian military under the Shah was there-

fore only achieved at the expense of Iranian independence. Moreover, in the view of American defense experts, this dependence was likely to grow if the equipment became more sophisticated. It was noted (U.S. Military, 1976) that "in relation to the F-14, Iran is like a Texan auto dealer dependent on Detroit" (p. 51).

Another important element was that, inevitably, such massive military build-up only frightened most of the Shah's Arab neighbors, whose suspicions of renewed Persian imperialism evidently run just as deep as Persia's fears of their behavior. The result was marked coolness between them and the Shah. There was a powerful boost to the arms race all round the Gulf. Herman Eilts (1980), former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1965-70 and Ambassador to Egypt, 1973-79, observed, "While there was no Arab love for the Shah, he was viewed throughout the Gulf -- often to his annoyance -- as the bastion of the American power position in the Southwest Asian area" (p. 89).

The Arab states of the Gulf rejected the Shah's plans for collective security in the Gulf. They seemed to recognize a further and genuine conflict of interest in the long run between the Shah's ambition to make Iran a "great power" and their own wish to strengthen Arab influence in the world.

Different Fronts

In taking up his "policeman" role after the British withdrawal from the Gulf, the Shah had to make some fast moves to assume his trump card, his claim to Bahrain. On the eve of the British departure

(November 30, 1971), Iran landed troops on and seized the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs, three Arab islands near the Strait of Hormuz.

The British government, which then concluded the foreign relations of the Trucial States, believed that the island of Abu Musa rightfully belonged to the Sheik of Sharjah, while the two Tumb Islands belonged to the Sheik of Ras-al-Khaimah. (Burrell & Cottrell, 1972, p. 16)

The scenario of events leading to the Iranian takeover of these demonstrated Iranian determination to dominate the region. An Iranian takeover of some sort was virtually inevitable, ("Three Islands," 1971, p. 30) but the manner in which it was accomplished, not without British connivance and American satisfaction, was calculated to highlight the inability and unwillingness of the Arab Gulf states to challenge Iran ("Iran's Expanding," 1972, p. 6). When asked (Time, Nov. 4, 1974) about the Arab rivalry in the Gulf, the Shah replied, "That is very funny, because without Iran to defend them they would be dead. Our first choice is to cooperate with all Arab countries on an equal basis. Our second choice is to go it alone if necessary" (Prager, 1974, p. 34).

To placate the Arabs, Iran dropped its ancient territorial claim to Bahrain.

It has been suspected that when the Shah pressed his claim to Bahrain, he did so with the sole purpose of relinquishing them with apparent magnanimity, as he did in May 1970, to obtain his real objectives, the three islands in the Strait. (Congressional Quarterly, 1972, pp. 50-51)

In November 1970, a year before the takeover, the newly enlarged Iranian forces staged a major military exercise aimed at Beni Farur,

an Iranian island in close proximity to those targeted for takeover. As the day of British withdrawal neared, Iran rejected a face-saving approach of leasing full military rights on the islands while allowing the sheikdoms to retain title to them. Something close to that was arranged with Abu Musa which was partitioned into Iranian and Arab zones, probably as means of substituting Iranian financial aid to Sharjah for British rent payments on its lease there. The Tumb islands were occupied by force. Abu Musa is now the site of a new Iranian airbase, and all the islands have been heavily fortified by Iran. It is from these three islands that the Shah planned to extend his control over the very crucial Strait of Hormuz.

The Shah's huge military build-up was explained by Iranian Officials in terms of threats that they saw from "conflicting national interests and Communist subversion" from an area where security responsibilities are not well defined. They believed that the major danger is neighboring Iraq, an Arab socialist country that is equipped with the most modern and sophisticated Soviet weapons and which supports revolutionary movements in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East areas. The Shah referred to the Baathist regime in Iraq as "a group of crazy, blood-thirsty savages" (Sixty Minutes, Feb. 24, 1974).

The dispute over Shatt el-Arab between Iran and Iraq ended in 1975 -- Iran also stopped arming the Kurdish rebels in Iraq which led to the end of the Iraqi civil war.

The Iraqi-Irani agreement to end their dispute was thought perhaps to open a new chapter in Gulf affairs. It could also serve,

as The Christian Science Monitor noted, "to reduce Soviet influence in an area of key strategic importance to the United States" ("Persian Gulf Waits," 1975, p. 1). This agreement was also interpreted as the Shah's bid to gain some toleration for his dominant role in the Gulf where he occupied the three Arab islands in 1971 ("Persian Gulf Waits," 1975, p. 1). Another element was the Shah's belief that this agreement might modify Iraq's old status as a staunch ally of the Soviet Union, wedded to the objective of overthrowing the traditional monarchies of the Gulf region.

The Shah's more intractable problem proved to be his role in the war in Oman against the forces of the Dhufari Rebellion. (This will be dealt with in a separate chapter.)

To the south, Iran has Pakistan as its neighbor. The two countries were allies, along with Turkey and Britain, all of which formed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). This organization was created by the Baghdad Pact of 1955 as part of the United States containment policy against possible Soviet expansion into the Middle East and the subcontinent. Iraq defected from the pact in 1958, after the monarchy of King Faisal II was overthrown. Iran watched with alarm as Pakistan was defeated in 1971, which led to the loss of East Pakistan. Neither Britain nor the United States came to Pakistan's aid. Iran gave some token support but did not fight.

Iran's military planners feared that any further breakdown of Pakistan, through separatist movements in the North-West Frontier region bordering Afghanistan or in the Baluchistan region on Iran's

border, could bring India's army closer to Iran's borders. These fears led them to draw closer to India. The Shah visited Delhi, entertained the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in Tehran, and made economic transactions favorable to India, in hopes of weakening India's pro-Soviet orientation and keeping it from granting the Russians naval facilities in the Andaman Islands or elsewhere.

Confident of his control over the Gulf, the Shah indicated his intention of extending Iran's presence to the Indian Ocean in order to counter the growing Soviet naval strength there. Iran's concern was twofold. It viewed the Indian Ocean as an extension of the Gulf oil lanes. It also feared that India might incite Pakistan's Baluchi tribesmen, and then Iran's own, to revolt. This would have the additional effect of weakening Pakistan as a buffer state. For these purposes, the Shah engaged American contractors to construct a \$600 million military installation at Chah Bahar, which would be the largest base of its kind on the Indian Ocean.

The Shah also moved to other fronts. He visited Egypt in January 1975. After that visit, the Shah supported the Egyptian view of the Middle East conflict and joined President Anwar el Sadat of Egypt in calling for the Israeli pullout from the lands occupied in the 1967 war. It is important to note that the Shah provided 50 percent of the Israeli oil needs, worked closely with the Israeli intelligence, and trained Israeli pilots on the American Phantom aircrafts.

The New York Times reported that:

Western diplomats in assessing the visit, said that the Shah had made his support of the Arab cause more explicit than in

the past on such key points as the Palestinian issue while in return gaining an Egyptian endorsement of his oil-price policy and of his ambition to make Iran a major power in the region. (Tanner, 1975, p. 1)

The importance of the Egyptian endorsement was even more apparent when viewed from the then Egyptian prestige in the Arab world.

Iran also moved to help bolster the Egyptian economy as a political reward for President Sadat's shift from the radical path of President Nasser. Multimillion dollar loans and credits were given to Egypt for various projects, including reconstruction of Port Said, construction of the oil pipeline between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and other industrial and agricultural projects.

Iran's special interest in Port Said has been emphasized in recent statements by Iranian and Egyptian officials. An Iranian foothold in the Mediterranean, observers believe, would advance the Shah's plans to give his country major influence not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the Mediterranean region. (Tanner, 1975, p. 4)

Thus the Shah became as Newsweek said, "the biggest fish in a small--but vitally important--pond" (De Borchgrave, 1973, p. 44).

Roots of Deterioration

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 is a classic example of a political revolution caused by society's superstructure, especially the state, failing to reflect, represent, and keep up with changes in a society's infrastructure. The roots of the Shah's regime deterioration reach back not to 1963, when Ayatollah Khomeini first raised his voice, nor to 1953, when the CIA deposed Premier Mohammed Mossadeq, but to 1949 when the Shah began the long process of creating an auto-

cratic state that would stifle all opposition, and would attempt to remold society in his own image -- or rather, in the image of his dictatorial father. By early 1949 the Shah, according to the U.S. State Department, was seeking an opportunity to free himself of constitutional restraints and to establish himself the undisputed ruler of Iran (Foreign Relations, 1978, p. 476).

The opportunity presented itself in February 1949 when a lone assailant tried to shoot the Shah. Although no evidence was ever produced to link the would-be assassin to any political organization, the Shah promptly declared martial law, banned all newspapers critical of his family, and detained many of the opposition politicians, including Mossadeq. He convened a Constituent Assembly which unanimously voted him the right to dissolve Parliament whenever he wished, and created a Senate, half of whose members would be appointed by the monarch.

Inevitably, the measures of 1949 created a public backlash. In the following months, a circle of prominent liberal politicians headed by Mossadeq, a group of religious leaders representing predominantly the bazaar middle class, and social democratic parties articulating mainly the interests of the salaried middle class, all allied to form the National Front. They demanded honest elections, free press, an end to martial law, and, most important, nationalization of the British-owned oil industry. By 1950 the National Front was holding mass rallies and was drawing large crowds.

Frightened by the mass demonstrations and further shaken by a

massive general strike in the oil industry, the Shah in May 1951 appointed Mossadeq to be Prime Minister, a "safety-valve" for public discontent. Mossadeq, however, was not willing to act as a mere "safety-valve." Having nationalized the oil company, he turned his attention to the Shah and accused the court of interfering in politics. In July 1952, he demanded civilian control over the armed forces. When the Shah refused to comply, Mossadeq appealed directly to the public. The public responded to the appeal and poured into the streets. After three days of bloodshed, the Shah was forced to relinquish control over the Army.

Mossadeq's victories, however, were deceptive. For as soon as he forced the Shah out of politics and threw the British out of Iran, an ideological split occurred between the secular and the religious wings of the National Front. Encouraged by this split and financed and organized by the CIA, the army officers expelled Mossadeq and returned the Shah to his throne. Returning home triumphant, the Shah proceeded to create the dictatorship he had always planned. With the help of the U.S. and Israel, he established a new secret police, SAVAK.

Armed with the military and the secret police, the Shah was able to dismantle the opposition. From 1953 until 1963 the repressive state machinery focused predominantly on the radical intelligencia and the urban working class. After 1963, however, it broadened its activities to include the clergy and the bazaar guilds. Ayatollah Khomeini, one of the six leading Shiia authorities raised a banner of revolt by denouncing the Shah for selling the country to Western

imperialism and for granting legal immunity to American military advisors. As the bazaars throughout the country closed in support of Khomeini, the armed forces struck at peaceful demonstrations, killing thousands in Tehran alone.

On July 5, 1963, a mass revolt broke out all over the country. The Army was hastily called in to restore imperial law and order, and the ensuing military repression was so ruthless that thousands (it is believed up to 15,000 people) were killed in the three-day battle. (Nobari, 1978, p. 64)

By 1974, Iran had become a police state. According to moderate estimates from Amnesty International, Iran had some twenty thousand prisoners, and the use of torture was widespread. In March of 1975, the Shah announced a new political movement which formally quashed even local opposition to the ruling Novin Party, and brought Iran more toward an official one-party state. The Shah's secret police, SAVAK, was estimated at seventy thousand strong. Visitors to Iran spoke of an "atmosphere of terror and fear." This atmosphere caused a "brain drain" as many technicians and intellectuals chose to leave Iran.

The economic situation became gloomy. Two thirds of all families in Iran's capital of Tehran earned under \$200 a year. Sixty-five percent of all citizens lived at subsistence level. Over 70 percent of Iranians were illiterate, and malnutrition was widespread.

In May 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini revealed in an interview how he perceived the reasons for the upheavals that brought the downfall of the Shah:

His [the Shah's] is a dictatorial regime: individual liberties have been swept aside; the press, political parties and authentic elections have been suppressed. Deputies are imposed by the Shah in violation of the consti-

tution, religious and political meetings forbidden; cultural freedom and the independence of the courts do not exist anymore. The Shah has appropriated the three powers. He has established a single party, and worse still, he made it obligatory to join the party or suffer the consequences.

Our agriculture has been destroyed, whereas 23 years ago its output exceeds our requirements because we were not exporters. According to the statistics supplied by the Shah's own premier two years ago, Iran imports 93 percent of its food requirements. That is what the Shah's so-called agrarian reform has achieved. Our universities are shut for most of the time, our students are beaten up and imprisoned several times every year.

The Shah has destroyed our economy and squandered revenue from oil--the wealth of the future--on gadgety weapons which he acquires at overblown prices. It is an attack on the country's independence.

I am against the Shah precisely because his policies, kowtowing to foreign powers, compromise my people's development. ("Back to the Koran," 1978, p. 13)

Most of all, the Shah suffered from the lack of legitimacy among the Iranian people. As the events of 1978-79 unraveled, loyalty for the Shah was almost completely absent. According to Richard Cottam (1979), a keen observer of Iran and a former political officer at the American embassy in Tehran in 1956-58, the Shah was regarded by his people:

as a traitor, a creation of American and British imperialism. In their view, the Shah's regime reflected American interests as faithfully as Vidkun Quisling's puppet government in Norway reflected the interests of Nazi Germany in World War II. (pp. 3-4)

Due to the Shah's vital importance to the U.S. as a "regional stabilizer" and to his close "friendship" with Nixon and Kissinger, Washington broke off all contact with the opposition in Iran and turned a blind eye to his self-defeating internal policies.

As late as August [1978] U.S. intelligence authorities had not understood the magnitude of the opposition to the Shah--over-reliance on Iranian security sources for intelligence

having deprived them of precisely the kind of objective analysis that was crucial in a time of change. Unwilling to risk the Shah's personal displeasure or short-term bilateral goals, the U.S. (especially under Presidents Nixon and Ford and Secretary Kissinger) had signally failed to exercise an influence commensurate with her long and growing interest in Iran.

Oblivious to the mounting evidence of mismanagement and corruption, successive U.S. governments had failed to impress upon the Shah the need for reform and decentralization of authority. Ironically, her entanglement had made the U.S. dependent: unwilling to use her influence, she became a captive of indigenous and local circumstance. (The International Institute, 1979, p. 54)

Hermann Eilts (1980) asserted that "since the Shah was a valuable security asset in the Gulf, Washington preferred to ignore or to downplay the domestic shortcomings of his misrule and oppression" (p. 94). A high-ranking State Department official complained that from the 1960s when the U.S. had as many as 17 embassy staffers in Iran doing political reporting, by 1977 there were only two. "You don't report on an ally once he's become The Chosen Instrument. It's bad manners," he said (Sale, 1980, p. 87).

In addition to "The Chosen Instrument" factor, another factor emerged as the other reason why Nixon and Kissinger chose to turn a blind eye to the Shah's "misrule and oppression." This was the "friendship" that binded the three over the years. The Shah wrote from his exile:

I was touched and grateful that President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger visited me. Both are old and treasured friends, and their visits showed how much they still cared, not only for me but more importantly for the problems we had fought together for so long to solve. I had long discussions with both men and found that our views on geopolitics still coincided, as they had during our common years in power when relations between the U.S. and Iran were so close. (Pahlavi, 1980, p. 16)


OMAN: THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN ACTION

Oman enjoys the crucial strategic position in the whole of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula which governs the most important international waterway linked by direct relations with oil. Oman is a rich land holding beneath it vast oil and huge quantities of mineral wealth. These important features activated European involvement to maintain extensive control in Oman.

Dhufar, the northernmost province of Oman, where an insurgency began in June 1965, has an area of about 25,000 square miles and a population of 120,000. Oman has a population of 750,000 (1972 estimates). The social and productive life in Dhufar is distinguished by certain characteristics that set it apart from any other area in the Gulf. The people of Dhufar live mainly in small villages and along the coast, often cut off from one another by high ridges of hills. Most of its citizens, until recently, lived in deep valleys in huts built of tree branches. Tribal rivalries are reinforced by prejudice and ignorance. The country of which Dhufar is a part was formerly known as Muscat and Oman, the name being shortened to Oman by Sultan Qabus after his ascension in 1970. Traditionally, Muscat included the section so named and the coastal areas, while Oman indicated the inland highlands.

A History

In the eighteenth century Oman was a major sea power in the Indian Ocean. In 1798 Britain signed a treaty of protection with the



Source: The Ministry of Information, (no date of publication available), p. 4.

Sultan, in direct response to Napoleon's occupation of Egypt which threatened Britain's sea-routes to India. From that time Britain exerted substantial control over Oman's affairs. British soldiers commanded the sultan's forces and British civilians undertook the usually unrewarding task of advising his administration.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Dhufar became an established province of the Sultanate of Oman and was ruled by members of the Al Bu Said dynasty from Muscat. In 1932 Sultan Said bin Taimur came to the throne and had to face European involvement on a scale previously unknown. During 1941 and 1942, when Axis forces posed their greatest threat to the British position in Egypt, it became clear that there was a pressing need for the establishment of a secure alternative route across Central Africa and Southern Arabia to India and South Eastern Asia. Sultan Said made land available and air strips were built at Salalah in Dhufar and on Masirah island. The later base was the more important and was used by the United States Air Force as well as by the Royal Air Force (RAF).

Sultan Said, however, saw many dangers in the extension of Western influence and tried hard to preserve traditional ways of life. The gates of the capital city, Muscat, were barred at dusk and all foreign visitors needed a visa signed personally by the Sultan. Medicines, radios, music, dancing, spectacles, trousers, cigarettes and books were all forbidden.

The Sultan's income was very low and the resources needed for development projects just did not exist. Any great increase in Oman's

resources could come only from oil, so in the early 1960s exploration work went ahead. Production of oil began in 1967 but exports in that year totalled only 2.9 million tons. Oil revenues rose steadily from \$3.6 million in 1967 to \$124.1 million in 1971 (Petroleum Development, 1971, p. 13).

P.F.L.O.

Although the economic prospects had begun to improve, the political situation in Oman remained grim. Small but increasing numbers of the Sultan's subjects began to resent the traditional nature of his life. A ban that prevented the mountain people of Dhufar from working for foreign oil companies was particularly resented, and on June 9, 1965 an oil company truck was blown up. That date is generally regarded as the beginning of the revolt in Dhufar led by the Dhufar Liberation Front (DLF) (see Appendix K for DLF's Declaration). Initially, however, the revolt was very small in scale and activity was limited to sporadic attacks on the road linking Salalah with Thamarit. Even when Saudi Arabian help was given to the rebels (Halliday, 1974, pp. 30-34), the scope of their efforts did not increase greatly and Sultan Said took few steps to crush the movement.

The situation began to change noticeably in 1967. In that year the British withdrawal from the Aden Protectorate was completed and the rebel movement came to possess a secure and friendly neighboring refuge from which to operate. The Port of Hanf just inside the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was used to supply arms

and instructions and the scope of the rebel movement was quickly extended.

The movement had a national character at first, until 1967 when its direction was changed by the communists. It then spoke of the creation of Scientific-Socialism. At the second conference of the DFL, held in September 1968, it was decided to broaden the aims of the organization, which was renamed the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). The declared aim was to spread Marxism throughout Oman and the Arabian Gulf (see Appendix L).

Money, arms, instructions and supplies were provided to PFLOAG by both China and the Soviet Union, and Cuba also provided some instructors who were channelled into PDRY (Wilson, 1971, pp. 32-33). By 1973 Soviet influence, however, edged out the Chinese (Luchsinger, 1973, p. 18). Part of the reason was said to be that "they [PFLOAG leaders] had been too closely identified with the discredited Lin Pia before his death in 1971" (Pace, 1975, p. 1).

The rebels had three important strategic advantages. The first was foreign aid. The second was a supply route, with a sanctuary that the Omani forces could not attack without openly committing an act of war against South Yemen. The third was that Dhufar is an ideal guerilla country. According to Charles Wakebridge (1974), an expert on the military aspect of contemporary Middle East affairs:

When flushed out from their normal areas by cleaning operations . . . the hard pressed insurgents retire into Moon Mountain, the high backbone ridge that runs from south-west to north-east through the centre of Dhufar, where it is extremely difficult for the Sultan's soldiers to follow

them. The craggy nature of the mountains makes it hazardous to use helicopters to airlift men into them. (p. 9)

PFLOAG's operations grew and the British finally came to grips with the seriousness of their situation when they "approved" of Sultan Said's son, the Sanhurst-trained Qabus, to take over in July 1970. By then large parts of Dhufar were under PFLOAG's control. According to Strategic Survey 1972 (The International Institute, 1973), "by 1970, when Sultan Qabus bin Said seized power from his father in Oman, PFLOAG controlled western Dhufar and all the populated areas except the coastal Jurbail plain, from Salalah to Mirbat" (p. 32).

The core of PFLOAG was not known, although Qabus estimated it in 1973 to be 2,000 (Wakebridge, 1974, p. 9). To match PFLOAG's growing strength, Sultan Qabus sought to increase his own. "By the year 1972 his [Qabus] armed forces had been increased from about 2,500 men to about 10,000 and the number of their British officers from less than 100 to some 250" (The International Institute, 1973, p. 32). It was reported ("Oman Looks," 1975, p. 5B) that one third of the enlisted men in Qabus' army were Baluchi tribesmen recruited in Pakistan.

Against this background, it was the policy of Sultan Qabus to persuade his neighbors that this was as much their struggle as it was his, and to elect their support. With this in mind, he visited almost all of his Arab neighbors and Iran. The Sultan was clearly successful in his strategy of converting the campaign from a national to a regional struggle. However, the most massive support came not from an Arab state but from Iran.

The Sultan had other military help that included Jordanian artil-

lery personnel and officers from the United Arab Emirates; to contain the insurgents, Saudi Arabian troops patrolled the desert along the north-eastern edge of Dhufar. Saudi Arabia also financed much of Qabus' army.

One of the main reasons that PFLOAG had to be "wrapped up" soon was that it continued to drain more than half of Oman's financial revenues ("Oman Payments," 1974, p. 1154). Midway through 1974 the Sultan ordered a halt to new development expenditures until the defeat of the PFLOAG ("Oman: Sultan Halts," 1974, p. 1024).

The Shah's Intervention

Until 1972, the U.S. had been content to leave the counter-revolutionary war in Oman to the British, owing partly to the decades of British experience in and control of the Sultanate and to the U.S. reluctance to get involved in a Vietnam-type struggle in Arabia. The British withdrawal from the Gulf states was not intended to apply to Oman under the contention that Oman had always been independent and therefore the British would honor the Sultan's request for their continued presence. The total number of British personnel in Dhufar was about 1,000 (Halliday, 1974, p. 345). Despite their efforts, the British were unable to make any headway against PFLOAG which still held the initiatives in the struggle. At about this time the Pentagon sent a team to observe the war in Dhufar. They came back recommending against direct U.S. involvement ("Pentagon Assesses," 1975, p. 5). By this time the first Iranian military personnel were sent in.

The large-scale invasion of Iranian troops did not come for another year, in December 1973. Expansion of the SAF continued and more Omanis were recruited to the army.

In late November-early December 1975, using the annual CENTO naval exercises as a cover, Iranian troops were transferred from the base at Chah Bahar to the Kuria Muria islands off the Dhufar coast. The number of Iranian troops involved in the invasion of Dhufar varies according to the source: the Sultan claimed they numbered only several hundred; PFLOAG claimed in 1974 that 11,000 were involved in the first attacks; a U.S. journal with close ties to the American military establishment, Aviation Week and Space Technology, estimated the number of Iranian military in Oman at 5,000 ("Mideast Countries," 1974, pp. 40-41). Whatever the exact number, their presence clearly marked a new stage in the protracted struggle in Oman.

The Shah's reasons for his substantial military involvement in Oman were expressed in Business Week, in reply to a question about his build-up of a huge arsenal.

Yes, because Iran has other frontiers. Our troops are involved in Oman at the request of the sultan and his government. If we were not able to send those troops there and if Oman were taken over by those savage communists, what would have happened to the whole Persian Gulf region? And what would happen to Japan, which depends for 90% of its oil on the Persian Gulf? What would happen to Europe if that lifeline was cut. (Taggiasco, 1975, p. 57)

The U.S. Role

The U.S. role in Oman had become more and more substantial towards the end of the war. Sultan Qabus visited the United States in

late 1974 and "reached an informal agreement with President Ford about strengthening his defenses" ("Oman Looks," 1975, p. 5B). According to the Arab Press Service (APS), the U.S. decision to aid Oman militarily was taken after several visits to the Gulf area, including Oman, by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Colby and U.S. Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms ("What's Behind," 1975, p. 1).

This U.S. decision to provide military aid to Oman was taken as a complementary step to the role played by the Shah, within the context of the Nixon Doctrine. A U.S. diplomat in Muscat stated:

U.S. Government policy is to support the continued role of the British here and let Oman rely on regional forces like the Iranians. But we would be happy to supplement Oman's traditional sources of military equipment. ("Oman Looks," 1975, p. 5B)

Among the 15,000 or so Americans that were reported to be in Iran in various capacities were at least 1,500 "civilian" military advisors working through such covers as Bell Helicopter International, and another 650 or so official U.S. military advisors through the Technical Assistance for Training (TAFT) and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG). In contrast to the constant efforts of U.S. officials to play down the U.S. role in Iran, it is pertinent to cite an official Pentagon statement (Foreign Assistance, 1973) concerning "Missions and Military Groups":

With respect to security assistance, represent the Secretary of Defense with the host country's military establishment.

Establish and maintain liaison between the U.S. defense Establishment and that of the host country.

Establish and maintain a relationship of mutual trust and confidence with the host country's military establishment.

Consistent with DoD policies, country objectives, and

financial guidelines, develop security assistance plans and programs in coordination with other elements of the country team for submission to the unified commander.

Assist U.S. military departments and their subordinate elements in arranging for the receipt, transfer and acceptance of security assistance material, training, and other services for the recipient countries.

Monitor and report on the utilization by host country of defense articles and services provided as grant aid, as well as personnel trained by the United States. . . .

Provide appropriate advisory services and technological assistance to the host country on security assistance matters. In developed countries, provide advisory services, technical assistance, and training to develop a realistic capability to plan, program, budget, and manage the military resources of the host country. (p. 1200)

The United States request, early in 1975, to use the British airstrip on the island of Masirah was followed by the sale of a substantial quantity of arms to the Sultanate of Oman, to whom the island belongs.

Reports from Oman suggest that the arms -- mainly anti-tank weapons -- have been sold by the U.S. Government to help the Sultan deal with a rebel uprising in Dhufar; but since the rebels use camels, and not tanks, the sale appears rather more significant, and is being interpreted here as a useful "sweetener" to help the U.S. gain access to the now crucial Masirah base. (Winchester, 1975, p. 7)

It was shortly after Qabus' 1975 visit to Washington that the U.S. and Britain announced an agreement in principle to permit joint use of the Masirah landing strip. The obvious reason for the American interest in using this island was for its use as a staging base for American freight planes flying to the island of Diego Garcia. Masirah is also within easy striking distance of the Arabic states of the Gulf and of Iran.

By 1974 the PFLOAG, facing the new military situation, had changed its tactics. It was divided into autonomous units, and in

Oman, the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) was formed.

Given the overwhelming military superiority of the Sultan's forces led by the British and aided by thousands of Iranian and Jordanian troops, the PFLO was forced to evacuate the areas it held in 1975 and to move into PDRY. On December 11, 1975 Sultan Qabus announced complete military victory.

In addition to his military victory over the rebellion, Qabus lifted most of his father's ludicrous restrictions. A development program was started to provide Oman with the roads, schools, clinics, banks and airports. This program weakened the rationale behind the original revolt.

Fred Halliday (1978) rightly summarized the main reasons for the rise and decline of PFLO:

The guerrillas were able to make the advances they did in Dhofar because of two basic factors: the revolutionary wave in southern Arabia that began with the North Yemeni revolution of 1962 and spread into South Yemen and Dhofar; and the ramshackle character of the Omani state. Both these conditions have altered: the Anglo-Iranian intervention, plus the deployment of oil revenues to strengthen the Omani state, have transformed the content in which PFLO operates. (p. 19)

Halliday (1978, p. 19) also pointed out a very crucial shortcoming, namely PFLO's inability to use Dhufar as a geographical "spring-board" to spread the Rebellion to the more important northern part of the country where 600,000 out of 750,000 people of Oman live. This was due to a 550 mile separation of desert and to differences in culture. Therefore, Dhufar was the wrong base for extending revolution into Omani heartlands and hence to the rest of the Gulf region.

PFLO continues to exist, at least politically, in PDRY. The number of its present members or supporters is not known. As for the future, PFLO is probably hoping to keep afloat until the winds of change in the region blow in its direction.

CONCLUSION

The Nixon Doctrine showed major change in American strategy to cope with new world conditions. The Truman Doctrine was an adequate strategy for the politics of a weak world. The Nixon Doctrine was a strategy for the politics of a strong world.

Objectives of the Nixon Doctrine were changed in emphasis and in priorities but not in fundamental content. Changed tactics were also an important part of the Doctrine, but are secondary to the strategic adjustments. The Doctrine was partially a response to the Vietnam crisis, but only in the short-term sense that Vietnam precipitated the Doctrine. Basically, the Doctrine sought to decentralize U.S. responsibilities and some of its authorities to its allies and friends, while assuring that the ultimate authority rested in the American hands.

The Doctrine had several advantages. It promised a reduction of American forces abroad and a realignment of responsibilities without terminating U.S. security commitments and obligations to friends and allies. It enhanced the posture and competitive position of American business abroad, particularly corporations involved in aerospace research and arms development. It ensured continued compatibility in weapons, doctrine, command and control between the United States and its closest friends and allies to assume leadership responsibilities within their regions that the United States could support, either formally or indirectly. But probably most of all it offered ingredients that enabled the Nixon Administration to avoid domestic opposition.

However, this "de-centralization" that was embodied in the Doctrine inherited typical managerial problems. It required the foundation of self-help and regional help among U.S. friends and allies. It needed a clear understanding and acceptance on the part of the U.S. allies and friends of its very objectives. It was difficult and delicate. The U.S. had to strike a balance between doing too much and thus preventing self-reliance, and doing too little and thus undermining self-confidence. Its generalities and ambiguities needed to be clarified and used. Consequently, detailed programs and action plans were required.

By nature, the Doctrine required "regional" thinking on policy and strategy, rather than "global." In retrospect, the Doctrine's main shortcoming probably was that its architects, namely Nixon and Kissinger, were "globalists." Globalists tend to view the world from the strategic perspective of the cold war and they fail to give proper weight to regional social, political and economic problems among developing countries. The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine necessitated the knowledge of what was possible within specific contexts. Unless the U.S. policy makers had a good understanding of local factors that were operating, policies would be likely to fail or to be counterproductive. No accurate analysis of the trade-offs between costs and benefits of different policies is attained without a deep understanding of the specific configurations of power in given countries.

In short, the Nixon Doctrine meant "de-centralization" of U.S.

responsibilities and authority; this required a "regionalistic" approach, which neither Nixon nor Kissinger was equipped to handle. This "regionalistic" thinking could be required nowhere more than in the Gulf region, with its complexities and intricacies.

It is very difficult to assess the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf, because it was vitiated by its own ambiguities and shortsights. As it turned out, and according to Eilts (1980), Nixon's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, "the Nixon administration gradually fused several disparate, but related elements into a kind of Gulf policy. . . .Its keystone was encouraging the Shah of Iran to assume the primary security role for the Gulf by providing Iran through extensive sales, with military hardware and training to do so" (p. 103). Therefore, the three key words of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf were: "stability," the Shah, and arms.

To the U.S. policy makers, and particularly to Kissinger, the meaning of "stability" emerges clearly: it increases or declines as U.S. dominance of the global system increases or declines. Any decline is part of a global challenge orchestrated by Moscow, which is intent on "waging a permanent war for men's minds," and "mocking the traditional standard of international law that condemns interference in a country's domestic affairs" by sponsoring "upheavals, revolutions, subversion." These conceptions were reflected in the way Kissinger perceived the threats to "stability" in the Gulf as "Soviet intrusion and radical momentum."

Kissinger failed or chose not to recognize that by the time the

British "withdrew" from the Gulf in 1971, the U.S. intrusion was far more tangible and more evident than the Soviet one, and that an actual danger is obviously worse than a potential danger. The Gulf region witnessed Portuguese, Dutch and British colonialism and intrusion for centuries. It is important at this juncture to recall Nixon's desire to fill the British "vacuum" in the Gulf and his inability to do so because of domestic pressures. The U.S. dependence on Gulf oil was growing while the Soviet oil production was rising. In 1975 Kissinger spoke of military intervention in the Gulf to secure the oil fields so as to avoid oil "strangulation" of the West. Perhaps, the greatest shortcoming of the U.S. policy in the Gulf was its emphasis on hypothetical rather than potential threats. This was evident in Washington's lack of awareness of the strength of the opposition to the Shah prior to 1978. This U.S. misperception of actual and potential threats to "stability" in the Gulf set the stage for superpower rivalry.

The disadvantages that the Shah experienced, in playing the major role in the Nixon Doctrine, certainly outweighed his advantages. First, he suffered from lack of legitimacy, because his people saw him as a "puppet" of the U.S. government. This was probably his opposition's most effective ammunition. Second, he had accumulated a long history of repression, corruption, dictatorship, and he lacked even minimal domestic support. Therefore, he was doomed by the irreversible tide of history. Third, he had dreams of grandeur that did not necessarily coincide with the American objectives in the Gulf.

Fourth, he suffered greatly from animosities with Saudi Arabia. Fifth, Saudi Arabia never accepted the role of "junior" partner in the Gulf. King Faisal regarded the eastern shore of the Gulf as Saudi preserve and he was known to take a dim view of Iranian activities there. Significantly, the Saudis refer to the Gulf as the Arabian Gulf, a meaning transcending geography or semantics. According to Eilts (1980), the Irani seizure of the three Arab islands "outraged" King Faisal who called it "international piracy" (p. 90).

By 1971, when the U.S. decided to replace the British by the Shah, there was no hard evidence to prove the existence of a "vacuum." The U.S. initial reaction to the British withdrawal could be characterised as "panic" and "hysteria." Therefore, the Shah had no clear role to play. Neither was there strong evidence to suggest that the U.S. Government, in the "spirit" of the Nixon Doctrine, consulted the Arab states before assigning the policeman's role to the Shah.

The quantity and quality of the U.S. arms sales to the Gulf, as a main instrument of the Nixon Doctrine, were initiated clearly by commercial opportunities coinciding with the diplomacy of the Nixon Doctrine. These enormous arms sales clearly satisfied the "strong appetite" of the American military-industrial complex, and accordingly had positive effects on the U.S. balance of payments. The sales also provided the Shah with strong military muscle and gave an illusion of security and stability in the Gulf. However, these sales developed great flaws that sharpened the downhill trend of the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf. First, they destabilized the Shah's

regime. Second, they created a greater animosity between the Shah and the Arabs and particularly Saudi Arabia. In his rush to get ahead and become the "Japan of West Asia," the Shah did not seem to notice that Japan once had created more resentment than it could handle with its ill-fated "Coproprosperity sphere" in South East Asia; but to his neighbors that parallel must have come to mind. Third, they diverted precious resources -- financial and human -- from socio-economic development programs. Fourth, the sales had the unexpected effect of luring the U.S. into a more direct role in the Gulf "security." This was contrary to the original purpose of the Nixon Doctrine.

The most successful application of the Nixon Doctrine came in Oman. Using thousands of his troops, the Shah was able to "crush" the Dhufari Rebellion militarily in 1975. This success, however, should be treated with caution: First, PFL0 had no real chance of spreading militarily outside of Dhufar, due to geography and to culture. Second, this Iranian undertaking did not finish PFL0 permanently. It still exists, at least politically, and enjoys PDRY's support. Future conditions could suddenly activate their role not only in Oman but in the whole of the Gulf. Third, it precipitated the Shah's role as the guardian of "Western and U.S. imperialism." Fourth, the Shah's intervention could be seen not in the context of "maintaining stability" in the region, but as an exercise of his hegemony.

The Nixon Doctrine appeared as the most sensible realistic and versatile path that post-Vietnam America could take. However, the

volatile and vital Gulf area was the wrong site for its test. The decentralization nature of the Doctrine required confidence and maturity. The very young post-World War II American foreign policy experience, perhaps, could not provide this requirement. Only a confident and mature manager could delegate authority. Delegation of authority requires a grasp of the intricacies of different parameters and their delicate interactions.

The Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf seemed in theory, if not in execution, directed toward reasonably obtainable, rational goals. It failed nonetheless because it did not take fully into account the complexities of Arab Gulf and Iranian politics.

Appendix A

WORLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION: DISTRIBUTION BY SOURCE, 1950-72

	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Aggregate Consumption (10 ¹⁵ Btu)	76.8	124.0	160.7	189.7	214.5	223.5	237.2
Per cent shares							
Coal	55.7	44.2	39.0	33.8	31.2	29.9	28.7
Oil	28.9	35.8	39.4	42.9	44.5	45.2	46.0
Natural gas	8.9	13.5	15.5	16.8	17.8	18.3	18.4
Primary electricity (1)	6.5	6.4	6.2	6.5	6.5	6.6	6.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Average annual percentage rates of increase

	<u>1950-60</u>	<u>1960-72</u>
Coal	2.5%	1.8%
Oil	7.1	7.8
Natural gas	9.4	8.3
Primary electricity	4.9	6.2
TOTAL	4.9	5.5

(1) Comprised of geothermal, nuclear, hydro. For 1972, the 6.9% figure in the table broke down approximately as follows: geothermal, 0.03; nuclear, 0.7; hydro, 6.2.

Source: Szyliowics & O'Neill, 1975, p. 65.

Appendix B

ENERGY CONSUMPTION, OIL CONSUMPTION,
AND OIL IMPORTS: UNITED STATES,
WESTERN EUROPE, AND JAPAN, 1962 AND 1972

	1962			1972		
	<u>United States</u>	<u>Western Europe</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>Western Europe</u>	<u>Japan</u>
10 (b) barrels per day						
Energy consumption (oil equivalent)	23.27	13.96	2.25	35.05	23.84	6.58
Oil consumption	10.23	5.24	0.96	15.98	14.20	4.80
Oil imports (a)	2.12	5.19	0.98	4.74	14.06	4.78
From Middle East/ North Africa (b)	0.34	3.80	0.72	0.70	11.30	3.78
From elsewhere	1.78	1.39	0.26	4.04	2.76	1.00
Percentage of energy consumption						
Oil consumption	44.0	37.5	42.7	45.6	59.6	73.0
Oil imports (a)	9.1	37.2	43.6	13.5	59.0	72.6
From Middle East/ North Africa (b)	1.5	27.2	32.0	2.0	47.4	57.4
From elsewhere	7.6	10.0	11.6	11.5	11.6	15.2
Percentage of oil consumption						
Oil imports (a)	20.7	99.0	102.1	29.7	99.0	99.6
From Middle East/ North Africa (b)	3.3	72.5	75.0	4.4	79.5	78.6
From elsewhere	17.4	26.5	27.1	25.3	19.4	20.9
Percentage of oil imports						
From Middle East/ North Africa (b)	16.0	73.2	73.5	14.9	80.4	78.9
From elsewhere	84.0	26.8	26.5	85.1	19.6	21.1

(a) Imports are "gross" rather than "net", that is, exports are not deducted. Thus, they exclude product exports from West European refineries. For Japan, excess of imports over consumption arises because of small quantities of product exports, refinery losses, and (presumably) independent construction of the two series. By showing gross rather than net imports, we overstate slightly the degree of foreign dependence. The overstatement matters, if at all, only in the case of Western Europe.

(b) Includes negligible quantities from West Africa in 1962.

Source: Waverman, 1974, p. 627.

WORLD CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 1960-1978
(bpd = barrels per day)

Major Areas and Selected Countries	1960		1970		1973		1975		1976		1977		1978 (4)	
	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent
North America	7,845	37.3	11,373	25.1	11,452	20.5	10,550	19.9	10,398	17.9	10,546	17.6	11,232	18.5
United States	7,055	33.5	9,648	21.3	9,189	16.5	8,370	15.8	8,154	14.0	8,244	13.8	8,701	14.3
Canada	519	2.5	1,305	2.9	1,798	3.2	1,460	2.7	1,339	2.3	1,321	2.2	1,324	2.2
Mexico	271	1.3	420	.9	465	.8	720	1.4	897	1.5	981	1.6	1,207	2.0
Central and South America	3,470	16.5	4,758	10.5	4,666	8.4	3,585	6.7	3,553	6.1	3,530	5.9	3,548	5.8
Venezuela (1)	2,854	13.6	3,703	8.2	3,364	6.0	2,345	4.4	2,301	4.0	2,238	3.7	2,166	3.6
Ecuador (1)	7	*	5	*	204	.4	160	.3	187	.3	183	.3	202	.3
Other	609	2.9	1,050	2.3	1,098	2.0	1,080	2.0	1,065	1.8	1,109	1.8	1,180	1.9
Western Europe	289	1.4	375	.8	370	.7	550	1.0	776	1.3	1,260	2.1	1,679	2.8
United Kingdom	2	*	2	*	2	*	20	*	244	.4	744	1.2	1,082	1.8
Norway	0	0	0	0	32	.1	190	.4	279	.5	279	.5	356	.6
Other	287	1.4	373	.8	336	.6	340	.6	253	.4	237	.4	241	.4
Africa	289	1.4	5,982	13.2	5,902	10.6	4,990	9.4	5,849	10.1	6,236	10.4	6,120	10.1
Algeria (1)	185	.9	976	2.2	1,070	1.9	960	1.8	1,052	1.8	1,123	1.9	1,225	2.0
Libya (1)	0	0	3,321	7.3	2,187	3.9	1,480	2.8	1,929	3.3	2,064	3.4	1,993	3.3
Nigeria (1)	18	.1	1,090	2.4	2,053	3.7	1,795	3.4	2,071	3.6	2,097	3.5	1,910	3.1
Gabon (1)	-	-	110	.2	150	.3	225	.4	225	.4	222	.4	225	.4
Other	86	.4	485	1.1	442	.8	530	1.0	572	1.0	730	1.2	767	1.3
Asia-Pacific	554	2.6	1,340	3.0	2,272	4.1	2,215	4.2	2,528	4.4	2,787	4.6	2,843	4.7
Indonesia (1)	419	2.0	855	1.9	1,339	2.4	1,305	2.5	1,508	2.6	1,685	2.8	1,637	2.7
Other	135	.6	485	1.1	933	1.7	910	1.7	1,020	1.8	1,102	1.8	1,206	2.0
Middle East	5,269	25.1	13,937	30.7	21,158	38.0	19,590	36.9	22,235	38.3	22,430	37.4	21,603	35.6
Saudi Arabia (1)	1,319	6.3	3,798	8.4	7,607	13.7	7,075	13.3	8,367	14.4	9,014	15.0	8,530	14.1
Kuwait (1)	1,696	8.1	2,983	6.6	3,024	5.4	2,085	3.9	1,918	3.3	1,783	3.0	1,865	3.1
Iran (1)	1,057	5.0	3,831	8.4	5,861	10.5	5,350	10.1	5,940	10.2	5,699	9.5	5,207	8.6
Iraq (1)	969	4.6	1,563	3.4	1,964	3.5	2,260	4.3	2,442	4.2	2,493	4.1	2,629	4.3
Abu Dhabi (1)(2)	0	0	691	1.5	1,298	2.3	1,370	2.6	1,952	3.4	1,999	3.3	1,832	3.0
Qatar (1)	173	.8	367	.8	570	1.0	440	.8	498	.9	445	.7	484	.8
Other	55	.3	704	1.6	834	1.5	1,010	1.9	1,138	2.0	997	1.7	1,056	1.7
Total Non-Communist	17,716	84.3	37,765	83.3	45,820	82.3	41,695	78.5	45,331	78.1	46,789	78.0	47,025	77.5
Communist World (3)	3,310	15.7	7,610	16.7	9,865	17.7	11,650	21.9	13,213	22.0	12,728	21.9	13,683	22.5
Soviet Union	2,960	14.1	7,049	15.5	8,420	15.1	9,630	18.1	NA		10,934	18.2	11,215	18.5
Other	350	1.6	561	1.2	1,445	2.6	2,020	3.8	NA		2,279	3.8	2,468	4.1
Total World	21,026	100.0	45,375	100.0	55,685	100.0	53,120	100.0	58,059	100.0	60,002	100.0	60,708	100.0

* Production or percentage of production is negligible.
NA not available

- (1) Member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
(2) Figures for 1976, 1977 and 1978 include all United Arab Emirate countries.
(3) Includes Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations, China, Cuba and Yugoslavia.
(4) Estimate.

Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 75.

Appendix D

WORLD PROVED OIL RESERVES
(Estimate at the end of 1976)

<u>Major Areas and Selected Countries</u>	<u>Billion Barrels</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
North America	69	10.3
United States	40	6.0
Canada	9	1.3
Mexico	20	3.0
Central and South America	22	3.3
Venezuela (1)	14	2.1
Ecuador (1)	2	.3
Other	6	.9
Western Europe	29	4.3
United Kingdom	19	2.8
Norway	7	1.0
Other	3	.4
Africa	65	9.7
Algeria (1)	7	1.0
Libya (1)	26	3.8
Nigeria (1)	20	3.0
Other	12	1.8
Asia-Pacific	22	3.3
Indonesia (1)	15	2.2
Other	7	1.0
Middle East	396	59.3
Saudi Arabia (1)	178	26.6
Kuwait (1)	79	11.8
Iran (1)	64	9.6
Iraq (1)	35	5.2
United Arab Emirates (1)	6	.9
Qatar (1)	31	4.6
Other	3	.4
Total Non-Communist	603	90.3
Communist World (2)	65	9.7
Soviet Union	40	4.0
Other	25	3.7
Total World	668	100.0





(1) Member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

(2) Includes Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations, Cuba, China and Yugoslavia.

Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1976b, p. 81.





Appendix E

PERSIAN GULF OIL IMPORTS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF OIL CONSUMPTION



Source: Thompson, 1980, pp. 132-133.

PERSIAN GULF OIL IMPORTS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION



Appendix F

REVENUES FROM OIL OF THE GULF COUNTRIES
(\$ millions)

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Saudi Arabia	2,160	3,107	5,500	22,574	25,675
Iran	1,870	2,380	4,500	18,800 ^a	19,100
Iraq	840	575	1,700	5,700 ^a	8,640 ^a
Kuwait	1,395	1,657	1,900	8,000 ^a	7,500 ^a
UAE	481	625	798	4,245	6,500 ^a
Qatar	198	255	409	1,362	1,690 ^a
Oman	115	122	177	857	1,231
Bahrain	<u>25</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>178</u>	<u>287</u>
TOTAL	<u>7,084</u>	<u>8,747</u>	<u>15,014</u>	<u>61,616</u>	<u>70,623</u>

^aEstimated, including revenues from sales by state companies.

Source: The Economic Intelligence, 1976, p. 3.

Appendix G

ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES' REVENUES, 1970-1978 (1)
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
Saudi Arabia	\$1,200	\$ 2,149	\$ 3,107	\$ 4,340	\$22,600	\$25,700	\$ 33,500	\$ 42,400	\$ 35,800
Kuwait	895	1,400	1,657	1,900	7,000	7,500	8,500	8,900	9,200
Iran	1,136	1,944	2,380	4,100	17,500	18,500	22,000	21,300	20,500
Iraq	521	840	575	1,840	5,700	7,500	8,500	9,600	9,800
United Arab Emirates (2)	233	431	551	900	5,500	6,000	7,000	9,000	8,000
Qatar	122	198	255	410	1,600	1,700	2,000	2,000	2,000
Libya	1,295	1,766	1,598	2,300	6,000	5,100	7,500	8,900	8,600
Algeria	325	350	700	900	3,700	3,400	4,500	4,300	5,000
Nigeria	411	915	1,174	2,200	8,900	6,600	8,500	9,600	8,200
Venezuela	1,406	1,702	1,948	2,670	8,700	7,500	8,500	6,100	5,600
Indonesia	<u>185</u>	<u>284</u>	<u>429</u>	<u>950</u>	<u>3,300</u>	<u>3,850</u>	<u>4,500</u>	<u>5,700</u>	<u>5,600</u>
Total	\$7,729	\$11,979	\$14,374	\$22,510	\$90,500	\$93,350	\$115,000	\$127,800	\$118,300

(1) In November 1973, Ecuador became a member of the OPEC, and Gabon an associate member; they are not included in the above chart.

(2) A federation of the Persian Gulf states was formed in 1971. Revenue figures for 1975 to 1978 included all UAE production; figures for 1973 and 1974 include only Abu Dhabi and Dubai; figures before 1973 are for Abu Dhabi alone, which is the largest oil producer among the members of UAE.

Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 76.

Appendix H

MONETARY RESERVES, MIDDLE EAST OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES*
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
Iran	\$ 208	\$ 621	\$ 960	\$ 1,236	\$ 8,383	\$ 8,897	\$ 8,833	\$12,266	\$23,152
Iraq	462	600	782	1,553	3,273	2,727	4,601	6,996	-
Kuwait	203	288	363	501	1,399	1,655	1,929	1,929	2,990
Saudi Arabia	662	1,444	2,500	3,877	14,285	23,319	27,025	30,034	19,407

* A country's international reserves consist of its reserves in gold, SDRs (special drawing rights which are unconditional international reserve assets created by the International Monetary Fund), its reserve position in the Fund (unconditional assets that arise from a country's gold subscription to the Fund's use of a member's currency to finance the drawings of others) and its foreign exchange (holdings by monetary authorities -- such as central banks, currency boards, exchange stabilization funds and Treasuries -- of claims on foreigners in the form of bank deposits, Treasury bills, government securities and other claims usable in the event of a balance of payments deficit).

Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 83.

Appendix I

U.S. TRADE IN CRUDE OIL
(bpd barrels per day)


<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports Thousand bpd</u>	<u>Imports Thousand bpd</u>	<u>Net Imports Thousand bpd</u>
1947	126	268	142
1948	110	353	243
1949	90	422	332
1950	96	488	392
1951	79	490	411
1952	74	575	501
1953	55	649	594
1954	38	658	620
1955	33	781	748
1956	79	937	858
1957	137	1,022	885
1958	11	953	942
1959	8	964	956
1960	8	1,019	1,011
1961	8	1,047	1,039
1962	5	1,126	1,121
1963	5	1,132	1,127
1964	3	1,203	1,200
1965	3	1,238	1,235
1966	5	1,225	1,220
1967	74	1,129	1,055
1968	5	1,293	1,288
1969	3	1,408	1,405
1970	14	1,323	1,309
1971	1	1,680	1,679
1972	*	2,222	2,222
1973	2	3,244	3,242
1974	3	3,422	3,419
1975	6	4,105	4,099
1976	8	5,400	5,392
1977	50	6,690	6,640

* Less than 500 barrels per day.

Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 79.

Appendix J

OPEC DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS FROM
FREE-WORLD INDUSTRIAL NATIONS



Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 85.

Appendix K

DLF DECLARATIONS

Arab people of Dhofar! A revolutionary vanguard has emerged from among you and, believing in God and country, has taken upon itself the task of liberating this country from the rule of the despotic Al Bu Said Sultan whose dynasty has been identified with the hordes of the British imperialist occupation. Brothers! This people has long and bitterly suffered from dispersion, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and disease - those pernicious weapons introduced under the protection of the bayonets of British Imperialism, and used against the Dhofaris by the government of the Sultans of Muscat.

Arab people of Dhofar! You bear witness to this state of affairs and have all suffered from this absurd policy. God has wished us life and they wish death. But the will of God is the will of Right which should prevail over this part of the great Arab fatherland.

Fighting masses of Dhofar! In the name of the free martyrs who fell in the battleground of dignity and honour; in the name of all the afflicted and the widowed and all those humiliated by the prevailing corruption and perversion; in the name of the Arab nation, whose sons are fighting in every part of their land - we appeal to the true Arab spirit in you to close ranks of the Dhofar Liberation Front to form an impregnable dam against despotism.

The government of the stooge Said Bin Taimur has enlisted the services of an army of Shu'ubi mercenaries to frustrate the goals of Arab liberation in this country; but the DLF will be like blazing fire against it in every part of the country. This same spiteful Shu-ubi (i.e., foreign, non-Arab) army has managed to obstruct the aims of the revolution in Oman; however, the Free Will which derives its strength from the will of God is bound to overcome. We vow to God that we shall teach this army a lesson it will never forget - the same lesson taught to the imperialist armies in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Yemen.

(June 9, 1969)

Source: P.F.L.O.A.G. [No other information available.]

Appendix L

THE PLATFORM OF THE
SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE
P.F.L.O.A.G.

September, 1968

1. To insist on organized revolutionary armed struggle as the only way to overcome imperialism, reactionaries, the bourgeoisie and feudalism.
2. To change the name of the Liberation Front of Dhufar to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf and to link the struggle in Dhufar with that of the peoples in the other parts of the Occupied Arab Gulf.
3. The PFLOAG denounces the fake Union of Arab Gulf Emarates and asserts that the only revolutionary and effective step towards achieving the unity of the Gulf is through the unity of the revolutionary popular forces.
4. The PFLOAG resolves to adopt scientific socialism as a theoretical guide for the struggle of the poor masses and as a scientific method of analysis.
5. The PFLOAG extends full support to the Palestinian people represented by its armed vanguard.
6. The PFLOAG supports the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggle against world imperialism and bourgeois and feudal regimes, and denounces the racist regime in Rhodesia and racial discrimination in the U.S.

Source: P.F.L.O.A.G. [No other information available.]

Appendix M

THE EIGHT GULF PRODUCERS

	<u>Area (sq. mi.)</u>	<u>Population (est.)</u>	<u>1973 Oil Production (barrels/day)</u>	<u>1974 Oil Reserves (bill. of brls)</u>	<u>Earnings from Oil Exports 1973 1974 Estimates (billions of dollars)</u>	
Iran	635,000	33,000,000	5,895,000	65	\$4.4	\$14-\$22
Saudi Arabia	830,000	5,500,000- 8,400,000	7,603,000	up to 460	\$5.5	\$19-\$27
Iraq	173,000	10,500,000	1,980,000	29	\$1.3	\$4.6-\$7.0
Kuwait	6,200	900,000	3,013,000	64-73	\$2.0	\$7-\$8
United Arab Emirates	36,000	200,000	1,500,000	25-26	n.a.	n.a.
Abu Dhabi	32,000	110,000	1,305,000	21	\$0.75	\$4-\$6
Bahrain	231	225,000	64,000	0.375	n.a.	\$0.34
Qatar	6,000	115,000	570,000	6.5	\$0.3	\$1.5
Oman	82,000	750,000	295,000	5	\$0.185	\$0.5

Source: Foreign Policy, 1975, p. 72.

Appendix N

PERSIAN GULF CRUDE OIL PRICES (1)
(dollars per barrel)

	<u>Jan. 1,</u> <u>1973</u>	<u>Jan. 1,</u> <u>1974</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>Change,</u> <u>1973-74</u>	<u>Jan. 1,</u> <u>1975</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>Change,</u> <u>1974-75</u>	<u>Jan. 1,</u> <u>1976</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>Change,</u> <u>1975-76</u>	<u>Jan. 1,</u> <u>1977</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>Change,</u> <u>1976-77</u>
1. Posted price (2)	\$2.591	\$11.651	+ 350.0	\$11.251	- 3.6	\$12.376	+ 9.9	\$12.995	+ 5.0
2. Royalty (3)	.324	1.456	+ 349.0	2.250	+ 54.5	2.475	+ 10.0	2.599	+ 5.0
3. Production cost	.100	.100	-	.120	+ 20.0	.120	-	.120	-
4. Profit for tax purposes (1-(2+3))	2.167	10.095	+ 366.0	8.881	- 12.0	9.781	+ 10.1	10.276	+ 5.1
5. Tax (4)	1.192	5.552	+ 366.0	7.549	+ 36.0	8.314	+ 10.1	8.735	+ 5.1
6. Government revenue (2+5)	1.516	7.008	+ 362.0	9.799	+ 39.8	10.789	+ 10.1	11.334	+ 5.1
7. Cost of equity oil (2+6) (5)	1.616	7.108	+ 340.0	9.919	+ 39.5	10.909	+ 10.0	11.454	+ 5.0
8. Cost of participation oil (5)	2.330	10.835	+ 365.0	10.460	- 3.5	11.510	+ 10.0	12.085	+ 5.0
9. Weighted average cost (5)	1.794	9.344	+ 421.0	10.240	+ 9.6	11.270	+ 10.1	11.836	+ 5.0
10. Weighted government revenue (9-3)	1.694	9.244	+ 446.0	10.120	+ 9.5	11.150	+ 10.2	11.716	+ 5.1

- (1) Prices shown are for Saudi Arabian light crude oil 34 degree API (American Petroleum Institute) gravity. Saudi light is used as a standard for Persian Gulf crude because it is the largest single type of crude produced there and represents a good average between higher-priced low-sulfur crude and lower-priced heavier oil.
- (2) The so-called "posted price" is a fictitious, artificially high price set by oil-producing countries for the purpose of producing the revenues -- royalties and taxes -- they receive from oil companies.
- (3) The Saudi royalty was fixed at 12.5 per cent of the posted price for the 1973 and 1974 dates, and as 20 per cent for the 1975 date.
- (4) The Saudi tax was fixed at 55 per cent of the profit for tax purposes (line 4) for the 1973 and 1974 dates, and at 85 per cent for the 1975 date.
- (5) The oil companies pay two different prices, and the weighted average cost per barrel falls between the cost for equity oil and the cost for participation oil. Participation oil is oil in which the oil-producing country has part ownership in the oil companies operating in the country. The oil companies -- because of their exploration and development roles -- have a right to a certain percentage of production of a cost something less than the market rate, which also is figured in the weighted average cost.

Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1979b, p. 80.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adelman, M. A. Is the oil shortage real. Foreign Policy, 1973, 9, 69-107.
- Alimard, A. & Elahi, C. Iran: past, present and future. New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976.
- Back to the Koran. Manchester Guardian Weekly [London], May 6, 1978, p. 13.
- Badeau, J. S. The American approach to the Arab World. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
- Barnet, R. J. Nixon's plan to save the world. New York Review of Books, 1972, 19 (8), 14-18.
- Barron, J. KGB: the secret work of Soviet secret agents. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1975.
- Batra, R. Muslim civilization and the crisis in Iran. Dallas: Venus Books, 1981.
- Berman, R. U.S. arms to the Persian Gulf. In D. T. Johnson & B. R. Schneider (Eds.), Current issues in U.S. defence policy. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
- Berry, J. A. Oil and Soviet policy in the Middle East. Middle East Journal, 1972, 26 (2), 149-160.
- Brewer, W. D. Yesterday and tomorrow in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East Journal, 1969, 23 (2), 149-158.
- Brodine, V. & Selden, M. (Eds.). Open street: the Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine in Asia. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- Burrell, R. M. & Cottrell, A. J. Iran, the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972.
- Busch, B. S. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- The Business Week Team. The decline of U.S. power, and what we can do about it. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980.

- Campbell, J. C. The burden of empire in the Middle East. Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1978, 1979, 57, 613-632.
- Can Russia be trusted? U.S. News & World Report, May 13, 1974, pp. 38-44.
- Carlsen, R. W. Seventeen days in Tehran: revolution, evolution and ignorance. Canada: The Snow Man Press, 1980.
- Chubin, S. Iran: between the Arab west and the Asian east. Survival, 1974, 14 (4), 172-182.
- Congressional Quarterly Inc. The Middle East. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1972.
- Congressional Quarterly Inc. Energy policy. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1979a.
- Congressional Quarterly Inc. The Middle East (Fourth ed.). Washington, D.C.: Author, 1979b.
- Cottam, R. Goodbye to America's Shah. Foreign Policy, 1979, 34, 3-14.
- Cottrell, A. J. & Burrell, R. M. The Soviet navy and the Indian Ocean. Strategic Review, 1974, 2 (4), 25-35.
- Cox, A. M. The myths of national security: the peril of secret government. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.
- Davies, R. P. U.S. commercial interests and policy in the Persian Gulf area. Bulletin, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973, Vol. 69, No. 1799.
- Dawisha, A. I. Internal values and external threats: the making of Saudi foreign policy. ORBIS, 1979, 23 (1), 129-143.
- Dawisha, A. I. Iraq: the West's opportunity. Foreign Policy, 1981, 41, 134-153.
- De Borchgrave, A. Colossus of the oil lanes. Newsweek, May 21, 1973, pp. 40-44.
- De Onis, J. Modernizing Iran seeks dominant role in region. The New York Times, July 4, 1973, p. 6.
- Dishon, D. (Ed.). Middle East Record 1968 (Vol. 4). Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973.

- Donaldson, R. H. The U.S.S.R., the subcontinent, and the Indian Ocean: naval power and political influence. In L. Ziring (Ed.), The subcontinent in world politics: India, its neighbors, and the great powers. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978.
- The Economic Intelligence Unit Limited [London]. The Arabian Peninsula: shaikhdoms and republics [annual supplement]. Quarterly Economic Review, 1976.
- Eilts, H. F. Security considerations in the Persian Gulf. International Security, 1980, 5 (2), 79-113.
- El Mallakh, R. Economic requirements for development, Oman. The Middle East Journal, 1972, 26, 415-527.
- Fallaci, O. Interview with history. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1977.
- Falk, R. Iran and American geopolitics in the Gulf. Horn of Africa, 1979, 2 (2), 61-70.
- Fatemi, F. S. The U.S.S.R. in Iran. New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, 1980.
- Foreign affairs: Near and Middle East. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, November 20, 1974, pp. 17-18.
- Foreign assistance and related programs appropriation for fiscal year 1973. U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2nd Sess., Washington, D.C.: 1972.
- Foreign assistance and related programs appropriation for fiscal year 1974. U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973, Part I.
- Foreign Policy Association. The oil states of the Persian Gulf. Great Decisions 1975. New York: Author, 1975, 71-82.
- Foreign Policy Association. The Middle East and the Gulf. Great Decisions 1980. New York: Author, 1980, 16-25.
- Foreign relations of the United States 1949 (Vol. 4). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978.
- Furber, H. John Company at work: a study of European expansion in India in the late 18th century. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948.

- Gupte, P. B. Swept by change, Saudis fear loss of old values. The New York Times, March 23, 1981, pp. A1; A10.
- Gwertzman, B. CIA revises estimates, sees Soviet as oil-independent through 80's. The New York Times, May 19, 1981, pp. A1; D11.
- Haig ends Mideast tour saying results please him. The New York Times, April 9, 1981, p. A12.
- Halliday, F. Arabia without sultans. London: Penguin, 1974.
- Halliday, F. Economic decline in Oman -- PFLO's new political strategy. Middle East Research & Information Project (MERIP), 1978, 8 (4), 18-21.
- Halliday, F. Iran: dictatorship and development. New York: Penguin Books, 1979.
- Hamer, J. World arms sales. Editorial Research Reports on Political Instability Abroad. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., May 7, 1976.
- Harrigan, A. Security interests in the Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean. Strategic Review, 1973, 1 (1), 13-22.
- Hartly, A. American foreign policy in the Nixon era. Adelphi Paper, No. 110. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.
- Hay, H. Persian Gulf states. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1959.
- Holden, D. The Persian Gulf: after the British raj. Foreign Affairs, 1971, 49, 722-735.
- Howe, R. W. Weapons: the international game of arms, money and diplomacy. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980.
- Hottinger, A. Iran and its neighbors. Swiss Review of World Affairs, 1973, 23 (8), 4-6.
- Hudson, M. C. Arab politics: the search for legitimacy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Hurewitz, J. C. Middle East politics: the military dimension. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.
- Hurewitz, J. C. The Persian Gulf: prospects for stability. Headline Series, No. 220. New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1974.

- The Institute for Strategic Studies. The Soviet dilemma in the Middle East, part II: oil and the Persian Gulf. Adelphi Papers, No. 60. London: Author, 1969.
- The Institute for Strategic Studies. Power in the Persian Gulf. Strategic Survey 1971. London: Author, 1972, 36-40.
- The Institute for Strategic Studies. Conflict in southern Arabia. Strategic Survey 1972. London: Author, 1973, 29-32.
- The Institute for Strategic Studies. Revolution in Iran. Strategic Survey 1978. London: Author, 1979, 50-61.
- Iran's expanding power in the Gulf. The Christian Science Monitor, February 7, 1972, p. 6.
- Joshua, W. The Middle East in Soviet strategy. Strategic Review, 1974, 2 (2), 61-67.
- Kaisar, K. The energy problem and alliance systems. Adelphi Papers, No. 115. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.
- Kaplan, L. S. NATO and the Nixon Doctrine. ORBIS, 1980, 24, 149-164.
- Kelly, J. B. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Kelly, J. B. Arabia, the Gulf & the West: a critical view of the Arabs and their oil policy. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980.
- Kissinger, H. A. White House years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.
- Kissinger, H. A. For the record: selected statements, 1977-1980. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981.
- Klare, M. T. The political economy of arms sales. Society, 1974, 11 (6), 41-49.
- Kolko, G. The roots of American foreign policy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
- Kolko, G. Vietnam and the future of U.S. foreign policy. Liberation, 1973, 17 (9), 14-26.
- Kolko, G. Main currents in modern American history. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

- Kooley, J. K. The shifting sands of Arab communism. Problems of Communism, 1975, 24 (2), 22-42.
- Laird, M. R. The Nixon Doctrine. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972.
- Ledeen, M. & Lewis, W. Debacle: the American failure in Iran. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981.
- Lewis, B. (Ed. and trans.). Islam (Vol. 2). New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.
- Long, D. E. United States policy toward the Persian gulf. Current History, 1975, 68, 69-73.
- Luchsinger, F. Rumblings in Araby: the Dhufar Rebellion. Swiss Review of World Affairs, 1973, 23 (9), 18-20.
- Manning, R. A. The Shah's imperial dream. Worldview, 1975, 18 (7-8), 19-22.
- Marx, K. & Engles, F. On colonialism. New York: International Publishers, 1972.
- May, E. R. The making of the Monroe Doctrine. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Meister, J. Iran's naval buildup. Swiss Review of World Affairs, 1973, 23 (4), 14-16.
- Middleton, D. Can America win the next war. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975.
- Mideast countries update forces. Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 11, 1974, pp. 40-41.
- The Ministry of Information and Tourism. Southern Region: DHOFAR. Sultanate of Oman: Author. [No date of publication given.]
- Modesta, J. The energy crisis facing the U.S. The Middle East International [London], 1973, 20, 13-16.
- Monks, A. L. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981.
- Moorer, T. H. & Cottrell, A. J. The world environment and U.S. military policy for the 1970s and 1980s. Strategic Review, 1976, 4 (2), 56-65.

- Morris, R. Uncertain greatness: Henry Kissinger & American foreign policy. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- Mutual development and cooperation act of 1973. U.S. Congress, House, Committee of Foreign Affairs. Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.
- Nakhleh, E. A. Arab-American relations in the Persian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975a.
- Nakhleh, E. A. The United States and Saudi Arabia: a policy analysis. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975b.
- New perspectives on the Persian Gulf. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.
- Newsom, D. D. American enGulfed. Foreign Policy, 1981, 43, 17-32.
- Nixon's Mideast dilemma. U.S. News & World Report, June 24, 1974, pp. 15-19.
- Nixon, R. M. U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's: a new strategy for peace. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1970.
- Nixon, R. M. U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's: building for peace. A Report to the Congress. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
- Nixon, R. M. The memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978.
- Nixon, R. M. The real war. New York: Warner Books Inc., 1980.
- Nobari, A. R. Iran erupts. Stanford University: Iran-American Documentation Group, 1978.
- Novik, N. On the shores of Bab Al-Mandam: Soviet and regional dynamics. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979.
- Oberg, J. Arms trade with the Third World as an aspect of imperialism. Journal of Peace Research, 1975, 3, 213-234.
- Oman payments prospects improve. Middle East Economic Digest [London], October 4, 1974, pp. 1154; 1171.

- Oman: Sultan halts development program. Middle East Economic Digest [London], September 6, 1974, pp. 1024-1025.
- Pace, E. U.S. supplying missiles and instructors to Oman. The New York Times, February 9, 1975, pp. 1; 4.
- Pahlavi, M. R. Mission for my country. London: Hutchinson, 1974.
- Pahlavi, M. R. Answer to history. New York: Stein and Day, 1980.
- Pentagon's arms sales abroad. The Christian Science Monitor, August 7, 1975, p. 12.
- Pentagon assesses Omani War. The Washington Post, January 21, 1975, p. 5
- Perkins, D. A history of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826 (Rev. ed.). Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955.
- The Persian Gulf, 1974: money, arms, and power. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974.
- Persian Gulf waits for Shah to act. The Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1975, pp. 1; 4.
- Petroleum Development Oman Limited. Annual report to his majesty the Sultan of Oman. Sultanate of Oman: Author, 1971.
- Podhoretz, N. The present danger. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980.
- Polk, W. R. The Arab world. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
- Prager, K. The Shah: thoughts of a royal decision maker. Time, November 4, 1974, p. 34.
- Pranger, R. J. Defence: implications of international indeterminacy. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprises Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972.
- Pranger, R. J. & Tahtinen, D. R. American policy options in Iran and the Persian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979.
- Quatrepoint, J. M. Iran's race into the future. Manchester Guardian Weekly [London], November 30, 1974, p. 13.

- Ramazani, R. K. Security in the Persian Gulf. Foreign Affairs, 1979, 57, 821-835.
- Rothschild, E. The arms boom and how to stop it. The New York Review of Books, 1977, 23 (21 & 22), 24-30.
- Rubin, B. Paved with good intentions: the American experience and Iran. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Sale, R. Carter and Iran: from idealism to disaster. The Washington Quarterly, 1980, 3 (4), 75-87.
- Schmidt, D. A. Iran -- self-appointed guardian of the Gulf. The Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 1975 p. 5.
- Schultz, A. T. A leadership role for Iran in the Persian Gulf? Current History, 1972, 62, 25-30.
- Schultz, A. United States policy in the Middle East. Current History, 1975, 68, 54-60.
- Scott, B. R. OPEC, the American scapegoat. Harvard Business Review, 1981, 59 (1), 6-30.
- Silk, L. U.S. oil plan: high price is key. The New York Times, November 27, 1974, pp. 51; 59.
- Sisco, J. J. United States policy toward the Persian Gulf region. Bulletin, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972, Vol. 67, No. 1732.
- Sixty Minutes, CBS-TV, February 24, 1974.
- Spanier, J. & Uslaner, E. M. How American foreign policy is made. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.
- Stingelin, P. Europe and the oil crisis. Current History, 1975, 68, 97-101.
- Stogaugh, R. & Yergin, D. (Eds.) Energy future: report of the energy project at the Harvard Business School. New York: Random House, Inc., 1979.
- Stork, J. Middle East oil and the energy crisis. New York: Monthly Review, 1975.
- Sullivan, W. H. Dateline Iran: the road not taken. Foreign Policy, 1980, 40, 175-186.

- Szulc, T. U.S., Britain quietly back military build-up of Iran. The New York Times, July 25, 1971, pp. 1; 2.
- Szulc, T. The illusion of peace: foreign policy in the Nixon years. New York: The Viking Press, 1978.
- Szyliowicz, J. S. & O'Neill, B. E. (Eds.). The energy crisis and U.S. foreign policy. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.
- Taggiasco, R. J. Recession's impact on Iran. Business Week, November 17, 1975, pp. 56-57.
- Tahtinen, D. R. Arms in the Persian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974.
- Tahtinen, D. R. Arms in the Indian Ocean: interests and challenges. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977.
- Tanner, H. Shah gives Sadat strong backing for Arab cause. The New York Times, January 13, 1975, pp. 1; 14.
- Taylor, M. D. et al. New dynamics in national strategy: the paradox of power. New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1975.
- Thompson, W. S. (Ed.). National security in the 1980s: from weakness to strength. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980.
- Three islands that could strangle Iran's oil artery. Middle East International [London], 1971, 5, 30-31.
- Tucker, R. W. Oil: The issue of American intervention. Commentary, 1975, 59 (1), 21-31.
- Tucker, R. W. American power & the Persian Gulf. Commentary, 1980, 70 (5), 25-41.
- Tucker, R. W. The purposes of American power. Foreign Affairs, 1981, 59, 241-274.
- The United States and the Persian Gulf. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East, Report, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
- United States arms to the Persian Gulf. U.S. Congress, House, Report to the Committee on International Relations. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 19, 1975.

- U.S. interests in and policy toward the Persian Gulf. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
- U.S. military sales to Iran. U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, A Staff Report, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August, 1976.
- Vance, C. R. U.S. foreign policy: toward constructive change [Address delivered at Harvard University on June 5, 1980]. Current, 1980, 226, 46-54.
- Wakebridge, C. Dhufar: the Achilles heel. Middle East International [London], 1974, 33, 8-10.
- Waverman, L. Oil and the distribution of international power. International Journal of Economic Interdependence, 1974, 29, 619-635.
- Weinraub, B. U.S. quietly sending servicemen to Iran. The New York Times, May 20, 1973, p. 3.
- Weiss, S. U.S. interests and activities in the Indian Ocean area. Bulletin, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 8, 1974, Vol. 70, No. 1815.
- Wessell, N. H. & Kirk, G. The Soviet threat: myths and realities. New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1978.
- What's behind new U.S. aid to Oman. The Christian Science Monitor, January 17, 1975, pp. 1; 4.
- Why Shah builds vast military power. The Christian Science Monitor, February 12, 1975, p. 3.
- Wilson, A. Sultan Qabus faces Dhufar rebels. Middle East International [London], 1971, 3, 32-33.
- Winchester, S. U.S. sells arms to Oman. Manchester Guardian Weekly [London], February 15, 1975, p. 7.
- World politics. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, September 11, 1974, p. 16.
- Yemna, J. Moderate Arabs relieved at Haig views on Mideast trip. The Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 1981, p. 11.
- Ziring, L. (Ed.). Iran and Saudi Arabia: India's other neighbors. The subcontinent in world politics: India, its neighbors, and the great powers. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978.